Why is economic growth lagging behind in former Comecon republics? by Fløtaker, Mathias & Larsen, Atle Børve
Norwegian School of Economics
Bergen, Fall 2019
Why is economic growth lagging
behind in former Comecon republics?
Mathias Fløtaker and Atle Børve Larsen
Supervisor: Ola Honningdal Grytten
Master thesis, Economics and Business Administration
Major: Finance and Strategy
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are
responsible – through the approval of this thesis – for the theories and methods used, or
results and conclusions drawn in this work.
Acknowledgements
It became clear early on that we wanted to write a thesis that addresses several aspects of
society, both economically, politically, and sociologically. Interest was aroused through
various subjects during the bachelor’s degree, which addressed these aspects. As civic-
minded students, we wanted to shed light on a geopolitical situation that could help us
understand why the world is the way it is.
We were therefore thrilled to be supervised by Ola Honningdal Grytten, Professor
Dr. Oecon at the Norwegian School of Economics. The many useful and interesting
conversations with a very talented professor have had a significant impact on the thesis.
We want to express our sincere gratitude for this guidance. At the same time, we have
been given full freedom to steer the thesis when new approaches have emerged, which has
helped us to maintain independence. Our work the past five months has been rewarding
and challenging both on a personal and academic level.
Norwegian School of Economics
Bergen, December 2019




Comecon Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
WB World Bank
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IMF International Monetary Fund
ICRG International Country Risk Guide
EU European Union
UNCAC United Nations Convention against Corruption
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
EU-15 The first 15 members of the European Union
iii
Abstract
Since 1990, former Comecon countries have been poorer than their neighbors in Western
Europe and, over the past 30 years, convergence has been weak. Economic theory and
previous research suggest that the region should have approached similar GDP per capita
levels more than they have done. This study will therefore seek to explain why the
differences still exist. Building on existing research on growth, the thesis asks: Why
economic growth is lagging behind in former Comecon republics, and what can explain
the internal differences?
Using quantitative data, we attempt to analyze the relationship between more and
less traditional explanatory variables for growth and GDP per capita through a linear
regression. Our results show that capital and labor in particular are very important
factors for growth in the region. It is also clear that corruption has a negative effect on
GDP per capita, while a larger proportion of high-educated citizens promote growth. The
parameters we use to measure institutional conditions do not have a significant impact on
GDP per capita in the regression. However, we believe that this plays an important role,
both to explain the lack of convergence, but also to the internal differences in the region.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivational purpose
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall 30 years ago, former Soviet republics have experienced a
major transformation. From communism, with a centrally planned economy and fixed
exchange rate and prices in 1990. To liberalization, increased privatization of businesses,
institutional changes, and integration into the global economy today. Building market
economies has been a challenging task with varying outcomes and a journey that has
affected hundreds of millions of people (Roaf et al., 2014).
Data retrieved from World Bank (2019) show that the average GDP per capita of former
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) countries was 37 percent of the first
15 members of the European Union (EU-15) in 2018. Despite the geographical proximity
to many of the world’s best-performing countries in terms of living standards and well-
functioning economies, convergence has been slow. Thus, we believe it is interesting to
elucidate which mechanisms have resulted in such economic inequality, and which factors
that are key to promote further growth and someday achieve the same economic welfare.
Through this paper, we observe the ripple effects of the decisions made by central bank
governors and authorities in the 1990s. We find it particularly interesting to examine how
much of today’s financial situation is due to decisions and the subsequent reforms carried
out 30 years ago. At the same time, it is useful to analyze today’s economic policy in an
attempt to pinpoint future areas of focus in order for the region to speed up convergence
towards Western Europe.
In this paper, we present background material on the economic development of the region
from the transitional period, through the golden age of the early and mid-2000s. Then
we look at today’s situation to provide context to the paper. In Section 3, we present
previous literature - both traditional economic growth models, but also specific models
for growth in transition economies. A description of data and methodology follows before
presenting the analysis and the results. In the end, we look at the results in light of
previous literature and discuss the limitations of the task before concluding.
2 1.2 Research question
1.2 Research question
Our data set consists of different economic and political measurements for 17 countries,
all of which at one time practiced a centralized economic system, but then completed
the transition to a market economy. Five of these countries have joined the EU over the
past 30 years and achieved fairly solid economic growth. The former Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) members, on the other hand, have not been able to show similar
performance. In this thesis, we look at the region as a whole to identify the primary
drivers of growth. At the same time, we use insights and examples from some of the
countries where appropriate, to make our analysis more concrete. We have thus compiled
data from all of the 17 focus countries under each explanatory variable. Structuring the
data this way results in more observations for each of the variables, which increases the
credibility of the results we get.
Table 1.1: Focus countries
Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus
Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic Latvia Lithuania
Moldova Poland Russian Federation
Romania Tajikistan Turkmenistan
Ukraine Uzbekistan
Much empirical research has attempted to explain the development in the region’s economy
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Fewer researchers have focused
on identifying the primary drivers of growth in the region today. At the same time, the
main emphasis in the literature has been on the Eastern European countries, while less
research is devoted to the former CIS countries. We have chosen to include these countries
because it allows us to identify cross-country differences within the region while addressing
a gap in the literature.
We use regression analysis to analyze the ratio of GDP per capita to various economic
and political measures from 1990 to 2018. The period chosen is because the majority
of countries first broke out of the Soviet Union during 1990, which means that the
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database before this is deficient. By including various political measures, in addition to
the traditional ones, we are interested in analyzing the importance of strong institutions.
This inclusion is useful to gain more insight into how a legal and structural framework is
essential for a well-functioning market economy.
This forms the basis for the following research question:
Why is economic growth lagging behind in former Comecon republics, and what explains
cross-country differences within the region?
42 Background
2.1 Transition period
Few, if any, regions have undergone a major transformation over the last 30 years, both
from an economic and political perspective such as the Eastern European countries
(Pickles and Smith, 1998). This makes the study particularly interesting given the region’s
proximity to many of the world’s great powers in terms of well-functioning democracies
and strong economies.
Where some countries implemented shock therapy - a rapid and brutal transition, others
practiced gradualism with varying degrees of success (Murrell, 1993). Liberalization of
prices, exchange rates, and trade, as well as more extensively privatization was relatively
easy decisions that quickly came into force. Changing the institutional structure, on the
other hand, turned out to be more difficult. Self-interest from people in positions of power
resulted in institutional changes varying across the region. Decisions made in the following
years still have implications for economic growth and living standards in the region.
Common was high inflation, increased unemployment, and recession in the early 1990s.
The difference, however, was that the countries that were on the front foot with reforms,
including the institutional changes, adapted much quicker (Roaf et al., 2014). The
consequences were brutal, but short-term macroeconomic instability, before eventually
achieving economic growth and income convergence against the rest of Western Europe. For
those countries that did not make the transition with adequate reforms, the development
was not equally successful. This resulted in more significant differences between the
Eastern European countries, many of whom still exist in 2019.
2.2 Golden age and the financial crisis
The early and mid-2000s represented the golden age. The entire region grew by almost 6
percent annually in the period 2002-2007. None of our focus countries grew by less than 3
percent - a consistent growth rate that has not been witnessed before nor after. Hence, if
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one had managed to achieve similar growth for 12 years, wages would have doubled (Roaf
et al., 2014). In such a scenario, Western living standards would be within reach relatively
quickly. However, the region was vulnerable after building up financial imbalances while
growing fast. When the financial crisis hit in 2008, it ended up stalling the economic
convergence to this day.
The financial crisis was a result of uncritical US lenders in the credit markets. The collapse
of Lehman Brothers in 2008 triggered the crisis, which led to a halt in growth on a world
basis. The same problems had arisen in the Eastern European countries, and with an
uncontrolled increase in credit, the economy overheated for several years before it finally
ended in crisis (Honningdal Grytten and Koilo, 2019). Capital flows into the countries
slowed and placed the region at the epicenter of the crisis among transition economies
in the world, with an average output decline of 6 percent. Latvia contracted as much as
25 percent of its GDP during the crisis, with Estonia and Lithuania close behind. All of
the Baltic countries had benefited from high capital inflows before 2008, combined with a
fixed exchange rate. This resulted in a more challenging post-crisis position. In contrast,
Poland had a floating interest rate and less foreign investment, which meant that they
escaped recession as the only country in the region (Roaf et al., 2014).
2.3 Post 2014
Most studies on economic growth in Eastern European countries focus on transition
factors in the 1990s from an empirical perspective. Fewer studies focus on what drives the
economic growth of the region today. Despite this, one can not neglect the post-Soviet
period, since the choices made at that time have consequences for what economic level
the countries are experiencing today. Because of this, we emphasize initial conditions, but
our analysis will focus to a greater extent on more traditional explanatory variables for
economic growth than much of previous research.
In the mid-1990s, the average income per capita in the region was 30 percent of the fifteen
most wealthy countries in the European Union, compared to 50 percent in 2014 (Roaf
et al., 2014). This indicates a strong convergence with Western Europe in the last 30
years, though one must be aware of the differences between the focus countries. The
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Baltics and Poland have experienced both income and price levels to rise significantly,
while the CIS countries have struggled to do the same.
Since 2014, growth in the region has leveled off, and several countries have experienced a
reduction in GDP, including Ukraine and Russia (World Bank, 2019). At the same time,
there are poor prospects of growth in the years ahead. Political tensions, especially with
the two countries mentioned above, may contribute to further weakening of the economy.
At the same time, new lines form the region. The Baltics and Poland are more closely
linked to Western Europe in terms of economic systems and have less in common with the
former Comecon countries. The traditional east-west line has shifted, which could mean
that countries in the east are at risk of falling even further behind. Thus, receiving lover
income, facing more unemployment, and living standards generally being lower compared
to the rest of Europe.
The lack of post-crisis growth may be a sign that economies are now more closely resembled
regular market economies with more stable growth and fewer overwhelming reforms. From
this perspective, one could argue that the "window" for economic growth closed in 2008,
where some managed to exploit it better than others in the early and mid-2000s (Roaf
et al., 2014). Thus, it is more appropriate to conduct a study based on more traditional
explanatory variables rather than pure transition variables in order to capture what drives
the growth today.
73 Literature Review
The question of what drives economic growth is often asked, and it turns out that the
answer is difficult to find. The issue is essential not only for economists but also for
policymakers, central bank governors, and ultimately the people of a country. Economists
started early in the search for answers to the question, primarily by analyzing economic
growth from an empirical and theoretical perspective. In the following section, we will
identify key literature and lay the groundwork for the knowledge found on economic
growth. We do this because it is essential to evaluate our research in the context of the
existing literature in order to argue why it is relevant.
3.1 From Solow to endogenous growth models
Solow (1956) was the leading figure in the development of neoclassic growth models,
alongside Koopmans (1963) and Cass (1965). The neoclassical framework seeks to
explain long-term growth through capital accumulation, labor, and increased productivity,
often referred to as technological growth. The main essence is that there is an inverse
relationship between a country’s per capita growth and the initial level of per capita
income. Consequently, a country’s output, which is a function of capital and labor, will
grow faster when capital is low. Thus, developing countries will grow faster than rich
countries, given that countries’ preferences and technology are approximately similar.
The model of Solow (1956) therefore draws in the direction of conditional convergence
in per capita income across poor and rich countries, as a result of diminishing returns
to reproducible capital. However, not all researchers agree with Solow. The literature
has different views on this topic, which is primarily due to different assumptions in the
models, which consequently give different interpretations. Romer (1986) argues that this
does not hold empirically for a large proportion of economies. It is especially true for
developing countries where institutional conditions are often lacking. Thus, it is a clear
difference between exogenous and endogenous models, which we will elaborate on further
in the theory section.
One additional problem with the Solow model is that growth in per capita output converges
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towards zero. This is solved by the introduction of an exogenously given technological
change factor. However, institutional conditions do not affect steady-state growth - only
on long-run output. Besides, Lucas (1988) points out that the basic Solow model predicts
that return on capital is many times higher in developing countries compared to wealthy
countries. Solow, therefore, implies that there is always new investment in developing
countries, an assumption that does not hold empirically.
Although Solow, in many ways, formed the basis for economic growth models with its
neoclassical framework, there has gradually been a shift towards endogenous models.
Romer (1986) introduced an endogenous model for long-term growth, where knowledge is
assumed to be an input into production with increasing marginal productivity. In this
competitive equilibrium model, technological change is endogenously given in contrast to
models with diminishing returns; hence, growth rates can increase over time, and large
countries can achieve stronger growth than small countries.
3.1.1 Weaknesses of the models
There is no doubt that both the neoclassical framework and the endogenous models have
weaknesses. Solow’s model has a relatively narrow scope, which does not take into account
non-economic factors such as political instability and institutional conditions. The model
also assumes continuous economic development, an assumption that appears to be wrong
historically. The assumption of full employment is also somewhat unrealistic.
The endogenous models of Romer (1986) Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991) are subjects to
criticism because it is challenging to validate results based on empirics.In other words,
the models provide a useful overview of economic growth over time, but Parente (2000)
argues that they do not explain why some countries are poor compared to others today.
He reasons for this, because the results generated from the models do not hold empirically.
Pack (1984) believes empirical research generated by endogenous growth theories does
not test the actual endogenous theory, but rather test earlier neoclassical growth models.
Hence, he argues that the endogenous models are no more than an expansion of the
existing growth models, rather than a framework for explaining actual growth.
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3.2 Augmented growth models
The work of Solow (1956) was further developed by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
The traditional Solow model explained more than half of the cross-country variation in
income based on updated data sets from 1992. However, the continued model highlighted
how the effects of savings and population growth were overestimated. This is due to the
omission of human capital. It showed that physical capital and population growth had
a more significant impact on income when taking human capital into account. At the
same time, human capital could correlate with saving rate and population growth, thus
indicating that omitting accumulation of human capital could give a bias to the estimated
coefficients (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992).
In the 90s, the traditional models were augmented with more variables and assumptions
with regard to explaining growth. Mankiw, Romer and Weil’s model was further developed
with a research and development variable by Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996). Both
Saint-Paul (1992) and Aizenman et al. (2007) included public debt as a variable, in order
to capture the impact of fiscal policy on economic growth. Fiscal policy to keep price
stability is believed to be necessary, and Kormendi and Meguire (1985); Fischer (1993);
Barro (1995); Guerrero (2006) have argued that there is a negative relationship between
inflation rates and economic growth. Barro (1995) suggested that an increase in average
inflation by ten percentage points per year would reduce the per capita growth rate by
0.2-0.3 percentage points per year. Although the effect is not substantial in the short
term, a change in monetary policy could reduce GDP by 4-7 percent over a period of 30
years. Hence, Barro (1995) considers that price stability is essential in terms of economic
growth.
3.3 Growth models in transition economies
When exploring economic growth and cross-country differences in transition economies,
the literature typically focused on empirical studies in an attempt to explain what drove
growth in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Here, the focus was primarily on transition factors
such as structural reforms, countries’ initial conditions, and macroeconomic stability. In
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recent years, researchers have often used the traditional framework with neoclassical and
endogenous models. Institutional conditions, external debt, the openness of the economy,
and corruption are all important explanatory factors in these models. Here we will briefly
explain the findings of both approaches.
de Melo et al. (1997) and Fischer and Sahay (2000) finds that initial conditions, regional
non-economic challenges, as well as political development, have an impact on economic
growth between transitional countries. Initial conditions are important because many
countries that already have financial difficulties will be more reluctant to take on the cost
of a challenging reform when they are already facing large deficits as a consequence of
the disintegration of the old system (de Melo et al., 1997). If reforms are implemented,
the initial conditions will not diminish their effectiveness. Liberalization has a negative
impact on growth in subsequent months and years, depending on how quickly the country
manages to stabilize. In the long run, however, there will be a positive relationship
between liberalization and growth.
Fischer and Sahay (2000) summarized the growth of the transition economies after
the fall of the Soviet Union and, like de Melo et al. (1997), they found evidence that
initial conditions in 1990 were essential for the next decade’s performance. Reforms,
with increased privatization and stabilization policies, were both active contributors to
increased growth. Additionally, the pace of reform - shock therapy and gradualism as the
extremes - was essential to how quickly a country managed to reverse its decline and begin
to grow. Thus, countries that carried out a rapid transition performed better through the
1990s (Fischer and Sahay, 2000).
In the neoclassical and endogenous models conducted on Eastern European economies
in the period after the countries stabilized, several explanatory variables are applied
to economic growth. Hlavacek and Bal-Domanska (2016) find a positive relationship
between FDI and economic growth in Central and Eastern European countries in the
period between 2009-2012. Ciftcioglu and Begovic (2008) suggests that external debt to
GDP, however, has a negative relationship with growth in the economy.
Evidently, there has been constructed and developed various theories for economic growth.
They range from the exogenous growth model of Solow to endogenous ones, where several
variables are included in the model. Additionally, research has stated that different growth
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models apply for different economies, like transition economies. All of these approaches
are relevant, and we will test different combinations of variables to explain what drives
economic growth in our focus countries.
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4 Theory
In this section, we will explain the theoretical framework that forms the basis for the
thesis. Such a foundation is vital as a thorough framework enhances the understanding
and analysis of our data. It is also useful for anchoring our approach in credible theory
applied in previous similar research.
4.1 Traditional Solow model
Much of our ideas, approach, and hypothesis is based on the neoclassical framework for
long-term economic growth initially developed by Robert Solow. The model is built on
several assumptions, which are presented in the appendix. The general Solow model
conveys that the level of income in a country depends on two input-factors: capital and
labor.
Y = F (K,L) (4.1)
The model can also be portrayed through a Cobb-Douglas function, where the exponents
on the respective letters represent how large share the inputs are of the entire economy.
Traditionally the exponent for labor has been 2/3 and 1/3 for capital, reflecting that
production, in general, has been labor-intensive.
Y = KαL1−α (4.2)
Based on the model, investments in capital stock and additional labor force will drive
economic growth. However, this can not continue eternally. The law of diminishing
returns binds both input-factors. Consequently, growth in output will be marginally
diminishing until one reaches a steady state where investment equals the depreciation
of capital (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2001). The idea is that output, Y, will partly be
consumed, and the rest is saved and invested. The following equation portrays the change
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in capital. The rate of saving is represented by s, and the depreciation rate by δ .
∆K = sY − δK (4.3)
As an example, a country’s output, which is a function of capital and labor, will grow
faster when capital is low. Thus, poor countries will grow faster than rich countries, given
that countries’ preferences and technology are approximately similar. This phenomenon
is known as the catch-up hypothesis and states that all countries eventually should reach
fairly the same economic level (Abramovitz, 1986). However, empirical evidence has
proven that this is not always the case. The major difficulty with the basic model is
that growth in output per capita converges to zero in steady state, which does not hold
empirically. Hence, there must be something outside the model driving constant growth.
This has been called the Solow Residual or total factor productivity (TFP). Without
increasing TFP, when investment equals capital depreciation in equation 4.3, the economy
will be in a steady state. First, when TFP increases, output will increase, and make
capital investment higher than depreciation. The economy will be in another steady state,
but with a higher level of output than before. New increases in TFP will cause new rounds
of Solow-growth and hence increase output.
4.2 Solow-Romer model
While TFP is exogenous in Solow’s model, Romer (1986) included TFP and hence created
an endogenous growth model. He called this addition technological progress, and it is
represented by an A in the model known as the Solow-Romer model.
Y = AKαL1−α (4.4)
If A were fixed, economic growth would eventually dwindle to zero as 0 < α < 1. In an
attempt to explain what drives technological progress, the creation of new ideas, Romer
points to R&D-related labor and the value of A itself.
However, only looking at technological progress as a determinant for cross-country
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differences in economic growth might be narrow, as TFP is likely to be composed by
multiple factors. First of all, a country does not only use technology invented in that
country. Thus, when looking at technology, it is better to consider the ability of a country
to adapt and use the latest technologies. Hall and Jones (1999) points to differences in
social infrastructure as a variable in explaining variations in TFP and hence, output. Social
infrastructure refers to institutions and government policies that determine the economic
environment where individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce
output (Hall and Jones, 1999). This will, among other things, include the adoption of
new technologies. Abramovitz (1986) refers to this as social capability and views this as a
decisive factor for the catch-up hypothesis. He proclaims that poorer countries have a
potential for rapid advance if they can facilitate the adoption of technologies and create
healthy economic and business environments in general.
The expression TFP, A in the Solow-Romer model, thus represent all conditions affecting
economic growth beyond capital and labor. In our thesis, we will apply the models
above. Our objective is to determine the factors beyond capital and labor decisive for
economic growth. In order to study growth rates, we will take the natural logarithm of
the Solow-Romer model.
log(Y ) = log(AKαL1−α) (4.5)
Equation 4.3 represent the geometric growth model when taking the logarithm. The
characteristics of logarithms enables us to write the model on another form, portrayed in
equation 4.4.
log(Y ) = log(A) + (α)log(K) + (1− α)log(L) (4.6)
The growth model on a logarithmic and arithmetic form is what we will study in the
analysis later in the thesis. This provides the possibility to study growth in GDP per
capita combined with the practicality of running regressions on an arithmetic model.
Hence, it is a desirable model to progress with,
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4.3 The ratio of capital and labor
The underlying mechanisms of the model also allow us to study the ratio of capital to
labor, which is interesting for our later analysis. The ratio is described by r = K
L
. Further,
the relative change of r, which is how the ratio of capital and labor changes in the economy,
can be expressed in the following manner. The full derivation of the term can be found in
the appendix.
∆r = sF (r, 1)− nr (4.7)
The function, F(r,1), is the total product curve as varying amounts of capital are used
with one unit of labor. In other words, it shows output per worker. As s is the share
of output saved or invested, the first part of the expression represents the increment of
capital. The second part is the increment of labor, where n is the growth in labor. The
change in the capital to labor ratio is the difference between the two terms. When ∆r = 0,
the ratio is in a stable equilibrium r*, optimal for the economy. As the returns to scale
are constant, output and labor will grow proportionally, and hence the ratio between
capital and labor will be constant. However, there can be cases where the ratio is not in
equilibrium,
Figure 4.1: Capital-Labor ratio, (Solow, 1956)
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An example is if r < r∗ , that is the level of capital to labor is lower than in the equilibrium.
In such a case, output per worker would be lower than it should be. In a market economy,
the level of capital would increase relative to labor, and thus boost the output per worker
and bringing the ratio r to the equilibrium of r*. Such a shift would increase both wages
and productivity. This is because productivity equals output per worker, and the marginal
output per worker determines wages. Both go up due to an increase in output.
In our analysis, we seek to find which variables are most important for economic growth and,
consequently explaining what drives differences in TFP between countries. Throughout
our thesis, we will ground our analysis and findings in the theoretical framework.
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5 Data
This chapter will present and further explain the data used in the empirical analysis. In
order to develop the study, data is separated into one dependent variable and several
independent variables. Our quantitative data is collected mainly from the World Bank.
In the following section, we will explain the different variables and present descriptive
statistics. To ensure the validity and reliability of our results, we explain where and how
we collected data for the analysis. This is a good opportunity to assess the implications
data collection has for the quality of research and how it could have been done differently.
We choose to include validity and reliability in this section, as it is primarily assessments
of the collection and data robustness that apply to our quantitative approach.
5.1 Quantitative data
In order to investigate differences in economic growth across countries and understand
what drives it, we need a comparable measure of a country’s national income and relevant
explanatory variables. The 17 countries we have analyzed vary greatly in size of the
population and the economy, ranging from huge Russia to small Georgia. To account
for this, we have chosen GDP per capita as the dependent variable. Nations with larger
populations will have a higher GDP, ceteris paribus. Applying GDP per capita in the
analysis enables us to compare economic growth across all nations, even Georgia and
Russia.
As our explanatory variables, we have included Capital and Labor, as proposed by Solow
(1956) in his model for long term economic growth. We have also investigated several
other variables likely to be relevant in explaining economic growth, such as corruption,
external conflict, and education. In order to decide which variables to include in the
quantitative analysis and which to exclude, we performed extensive regression analyses,
experimenting with different combinations of variables. The different variables will be
explained in detail later in this section. We will discuss the results of the analysis and the
effect of both included and excluded variables later in the thesis.
There are several providers of economic and demographic data for countries. Although
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Table 5.1: Independent variables
Independent variable Unit Exp. sign Interpretation
Capital formation 2011 USD (PPP) + Gross capital formation
Income’90 2011 USD (PPP) + Income in 1990 of respective countries
Employment Percent + Employees to total population (millions)
FDI Percent ? Foreign direct investment to GDP
External debt Percent − External debt to GNI
Educational level Percent ? Different education levels
Year-dummies Dummy ? Dummy for the years from 1990-1996
Fast transition Dummy + 1 if fast transition to market economy
Corruption Score − Level of corruption (from 1-100)
External conflict Score − Conflict index (from 0-100)
Democratic accountability Score + Government responsiveness (from 0-100)
Government stability Score + Number of years in office (from 0-100)
the World Bank has been our primary source for quantitative data, we have also used
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), particularly for gathering information
regarding the institutional quality of the different countries.
The World Bank is a global partnership comprised of five institutions providing financial
products and services to developing countries, as well as knowledge sharing and policy
advice (World Bank, 2019). Through its work, the World Bank has built up an extensive
database of statistics on developing countries which is free to access, to be used by
governments, academics, and others who would need it. It is this database we have used
to retrieve much of the statistics used in the analysis.
The IRCG is a guide providing political, economic, and financial risk ratings, which is
created by the risk analyzing firm PRS Group. It is the only political risk methodology
and data series to be accepted by the courts in commercial disputes involving the valuation
of political risk (The PRS Group, 2017).
There is limited data available for our focus countries before the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Hence, our analysis will, in large part, focus on the period from 1990 to 2018.
The countries were in significant transition in this period. This allows us to study both
traditional economic variables and more unique variables, like how successful a country’s
transition to capitalism was.
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5.1.1 GDP per capita
The dependent variable for economic growth in the analysis is GDP per capita. For the
highest possible comparability, we have sourced GDP per capita numbers in constant 2011
US dollar prices adjusted for differences in purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP is an
economic theory implying that the same goods will have a different price in two countries.
This is due to differences in economic productivity and living standards (Rogoff, 1996).
It follows that the value of 1 USD will vary in countries with different living standards.
Therefore, when looking at GDP per capita for several countries in USD, adjusting for
differences in PPP is crucial for comparability.
The data was retrieved from World Bank, and after that, due to inaccuracies in some of
the numbers, adjusted in consultation with Ola Honningdal Grytten, Professor Dr. Oecon
at Norwegian School of Economics. Further, the numbers were prepared for analysis
by taking the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. The consideration behind the log
transformation will be further discussed under the methodology section.
5.1.2 Explanatory Variables
In order to find the main drivers for economic growth and varying levels of living standards
between countries, we have included several explanatory variables. When deciding which
variables to include or exclude, we have turned to previous literature on the subject.
Additionally, we have tested the variables through regressions. In this section, the
explanatory variables will be presented and explained.
1. Labor: Share of population above 15 years that is employed.
• Robert Solow’s growth model propose labor as one of two main inputs in
economic growth. Therefore, we were naturally inclined to include the variable
Labor. We are analyzing a percentage instead of the absolute number of people
in the labor force. Absolute numbers could confuse a regression because we
are comparing very different countries. We retrieved the data from the World
Bank.
2. Capital per capita: A country’s fixed assets plus the inventory of firms in the
20 5.1 Quantitative data
country per capita.
• The second main input named to be crucial by Solow is capital. Again, to make
the data comparable, we use capital formation per capita in the analysis. Fixed
assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on), plant,
machinery, and equipment purchases. Further, it includes the construction of
roads, railways, schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and
commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by
firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and
"work in progress." (World Bank, 2019). The value of each country’s capital
formation is in constant 2010 USD prices and was retrieved from the World
Bank database.
3. External debt: Total external debt stocks to gross national income (GNI)
• External debt is all debt a country owes to nonresidents. GNI is the GDP
plus income of the country’s residents abroad. We include this variable as a
measure of how much foreign debt a country has compared to their output. The
hypothesis behind this variable is that when foreign debt reaches a critical level,
the large interest payments flowing out of the country crowd out necessary
investments and hence prevent economic growth. We gathered the data from
the World Bank database.
4. Educational level: Share of population with different levels of education
• As an additional measure of human capital, we include information on the
Educational level of a country’s population. Our data informs of the share of the
population above 15 years that has achieved different educational levels. The
four levels of education are no school, primary school, secondary school, and
tertiary school. The data is structured such that a person is only counted once,
in the highest level of education achieved by that individual. The hypothesis is
that a higher share educated population, particularly larger share with tertiary
(higher) education, leads to higher productivity and hence, more economic
growth. In our analysis, the variable for tertiary education will be called "higher
education". The numbers on education are presented from 1950 to 2010 in
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5 years intervals. To prepare the data for analysis, we divided the difference
between two five-year intervals by five. We then created a continuous time
series by spreading the number equally over those five years. The data was
retrieved from Barro-Lee Educational Dataset.
5. FDI: Net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) versus GDP
• Net inflows of foreign direct investment are the value of inward direct investment
made by non-resident investors in the country of interest. This variable is
measured against GDP and is similar in nature to external debt to GNI.
External debt is a country borrowing money from abroad and paying interest
on loans. Foreign direct investment is the net inflows of investments from
non-residents to acquire a management interest, which is a minimum of 10
percent, in a company operating in the country of interest. As with external
debt, it is a vital input for growth in developing countries. However, it can
also be detrimental to economic growth if the amount passes a critical level, or
due to other conditions such as corruption or currency depreciation. Another
reason could be that all profits gained on investments are retaken out of the
country. Earlier studies have shown that FDI is significant in determining
economic growth, but whether it is a positive or negative correlation varies
between countries (Bolanlee 2015). We retrieved the data from the database of
the World Bank.
6. Fast transition: How the countries transitioned from planned economy to a
capitalistic system
• In the years after 1989, several Central Eastern European countries (CEE)
turned away from the planned economy of communism, and towards the more
liberal capitalistic system of the western world. This happened through several
reforms in institutions and systems. However, some countries went through
a so-called “shock therapy”, through a Fast transition, while others turned to
a more gradual approach. These different approaches have seemingly made
countries, to a different extent, able to cope with macroeconomic challenges.
Thus, the degree to which countries have gone through a successful transition
or not in the early ’90s can prove to be decisive for their future economic and
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institutional development. In the regression, this is a dummy variable equal to
1 if the country had a fast transition, and 0 if they did not. Which countries
that had a fast transition and not was decided based on the IMF paper “25
years of transition – Post-communist Europe and the IMF”.
7. Income ’90: The income in 1990 of the respective countries
• All countries we study had different levels of income per capita when the
Soviet Union was dissolved in 1990. It is natural to assume that these income
inequalities are likely to explain differences in income at a later time. Therefore,
we include this variable to control for the effect of initial wealth or poverty. For
every period of the analysis, the variable is simply the log of GDP per capita
of a country in 1990.
8. Year-Dummies: Dummy variable for the first years of the 1990’s
• The first years after the end of the Soviet Union was a period of turmoil for
the CEE countries. Economic crises, low-functioning labor markets, and trade
and substantial reforms are among the troubles these countries faced. These
dummies are hence included to control for the turmoil of these early years and
prevent potential bias of regression results. Dummies were created for the years
1991 to 1996.
9. Corruption: An index indicating the level of corruption in a country
• Each country gets a yearly score ranging from 0-100, depending on the level of
corruption in the country. A score of 0 indicates the highest level of corruption,
while a score of 100 implies no corruption. For most countries, we have scores
from 2003 to 2018. This limits the data basis in the analysis, as a regression with
corruption as a variable would exclude most data before 2003. To compensate
for this, we constructed an alternative corruption variable. With the assumption
that the level of corruption remained relatively unchanged from 1990 to 2003,
the years with missing data were assigned the corruption score of 2003. During
discussions of the analysis in later sections, we will specify what results came
from the original data and what came from the constructed variable.
In order to potentially achieve better results, we created dummies for different
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corruption levels in addition to the index itself. We created two dummies,
one for scores below 25 and one dummy for scores from 25 up to, but not
including 50. Consequently, the third range is from 50 to 100. These ranges
represent a bad state, a medium bad state, and a relatively good state. As
a comparison, the average world score was 43 in 2018 (Transparancy, 2019).
Thus, if a country in one year has a score that falls within one of these ranges,
the associated dummy variable will take a value of 1. As the range 50-100 is
not represented by a dummy, it will be the default in a regression analysis,
which the coefficients of the other ranges compare against. The dummy for
a bad state will be referred to as "high corruption", while the medium bad
state will be "medium corruption". The corruption index scores were retrieved
from Transparency International. Note that the recent corruption scores of
Transparency International are on a scale of 0-100. However, the early publishes
contained scores from 0-10. It is indifferent whether the range is to 10 or 100,
as it is a matter of multiplying or dividing by 10. We chose to make the whole
scale in the range of 0-100.
10. External Conflict: The risk of aggressive foreign action towards a country
• This is a risk measure of external action towards a country ranging from
diplomatic pressure and withholding of aid to cross-border conflicts and war.
The motivation for including this is that external pressures like these have the
potential to impact economic growth substantially. The score was originally
from 0-12, but we transformed it into a range of 0-100 by dividing by 12 and
multiplying by 100. The data was gathered from ICRG.
11. Democratic accountability: How responsive a government is to its people
• This score is awarded based on the types of government that rule in the country.
The government form with the least risk (highest score) is an alternating
government – meaning that the government is elected through democracy, does
not serve more than two consecutive periods, and has independent judiciaries.
The form of government awarding the highest risk is an autarchy, where the
state is run by a single group or person holding power through military might
or inherited might. The score originally ranges from 0-6, but it is transformed
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to reach from 0-100. The data was retrieved from ICRG.
12. Government Stability: Governments effectiveness and ability to stay in office
• This measure assesses the government’s ability to carry out declared programs
and reforms and stay in office through its entire elected period. The total score is
the sum of three sub-components; Government unity, Legislative Strength, and
Popular support. The score was originally from 0-12 before it was transformed
to 0-100. The data is from ICRG.
5.1.3 Omitted Variable Bias
By including our explanatory variables, we try to control for any event or condition that
affects the GDP per capita in our countries of interest. It is, however, possible that the
analysis will suffer from an omitted variable bias. Omitted variable bias occurs when
a variable outside the model is correlated with both the dependent variable, GDP per
capita, and an explanatory variable. In such a case, the effect of the omitted variable will
be attributed to the included explanatory variable correlated with the omitted one. The
omitted variable biases the coefficient of the explanatory variable, and hence it does not
represent its true value.
Although we have tested and included a broad specter of explanatory variables, there are
several relevant variables we do not have in the model that potentially leads to omitted
variable biases. An example is data on the number of patents registered in a country.
More patents are likely to be correlated with higher GDP per capita, as it is indicative
of a healthy business ecosystem facilitating research and development. Additionally, it
is likely correlated with Higher education, as higher educated people are more likely to
have the competence to develop new designs and ideas. If this is the case, the coefficient
of Higher education is artificially high. The reason is the attribution of the effect of a
healthy business environment with many patents, in addition to the positive effect of
Higher education. It is positively biased. This is one example, but there could be other
variables that could correlate with both the dependent variable GDP per capita and one
or more explanatory variables. These cases would lead to an omitted variable bias.
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5.1.4 Descriptive Statistics
The purpose of the descriptive statistics is to provide an overview of the sample and
describe what our data shows (Loeb et al., 2017). In other words, we give a summary
of how economic developments have been across the focus countries - with a benchmark
against the EU-15. Also, we present key figures for the explanatory variables to provide
better conditions for interpreting our subsequent analysis.
Table 5.2 shows descriptive statistics on some of our data. Note that this is information
on all countries through all years of the analysis. One takeaway is the spread in GDP
per capita from high to low. The highest observed GDP per capita is three times as high
as the lowest. Further, if one only looks at Income ’90, it is apparent that there were
significant differences between the countries right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
From 1990 to 2018, the average growth in GDP per capita was 118 percent. The span,
however, is from Lithuania, with 375 percent, to Ukraine with a negative 24 percent.
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics
N Mean Min Max
GDP per capita 476 10 687 1 047 31 065
Capital per capita 397 1 424 35 6 255
Labor 470 54 % 35 % 67 %
Income ’90 493 8 081 2 981 20 639
Corruption 263 34 16 71
FDI 435 5 % 0 % 55 %
External Debt 350 50 % 0 % 158 %
No School 250 2 % 0 % 10 %
Higher Education 252 8 % 3 % 49 %
It is, however, interesting to look at the economic growth of each country in comparison
to a benchmark. Hence, we have extracted data on GDP per capita in fixed 2011 and
PPP adjusted prices for the EU-15 countries. These are the countries that were members
of the European Union prior to the accession of 10 candidate countries on May 1st, 2004.
We have taken the average GDP per capita and a weighted average percentage growth of
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these countries, creating a benchmark called EU-15.





France Luxembourg United Kingdom
Looking at the countries included in the benchmark, it is worth noting that it is not
purely success stories. Italy and Greece are examples of Western European countries that
have experienced turbulence in their economies.
First, we look at the relative growth in GDP per capita in each country, and the benchmark.
This is done through indexing all countries, where the base is 100 in 1990. The base is
grown each year with a percentage equivalent to the growth of GDP per capita that year
for each country. The indexed comparison from 1990 to 2018 is shown in Figure 5.1
Figure 5.1: GDP per capita, Indexed 1990
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Almost all focus countries had steep drops in GDP per capita from 1990 to 1995. The
EU-15 meanwhile, maintain a modest but stable growth. After 1995 however, the relative
growth is higher in all of our focus countries compared to EU-15. This is illustrated when
doing the same indexing with 1995 as a base, portrayed in figure A.1.1 in the appendix.
The benchmark EU-15 comes out lowest of all. Consequently, without a significant drop
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the focus countries would have grown relatively
more.
It is, however, essential to note that this is the relative growth. Looking at the absolute
numbers, the story is quite different, as portrayed in Figure A.1.2 in the appendix.
Even with the difference in percentage growth, the significant difference in absolute
numbers restrains the catch up. In fact, when looking at the difference between focus
countries and the benchmark in 1990 and 2018, only four countries have reduced the
absolute difference. The absolute difference is the GDP per capita of the benchmark,
subtracted the GDP per capita of the country of comparison. The four countries that
have reduced the absolute difference are Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. All of
them EU members since May 1st, 2004.
The relative difference has, however, been reduced for eleven countries, meaning how
large percentage a country’s GDP per capita is relative to the GDP per capita of the
benchmark, reflecting what the indexed comparison shows. However, the GDP per capita
of most focus countries is still lagging quite far behind the benchmark. Not counting the
EU countries, the Russian Federation and Romania have the highest GDP per capita in
2018, at 56 and 53 percent relative to the EU-15, respectively. The next country on the
list is Belarus, at 39 percent. Looking at all focus countries, none of them have a GDP per
capita higher than 70 percent of that of EU-15, Lithuania scoring highest at 67 percent.
In the past couple of years, the average growth in GDP per capita in the focus countries
has been approximately 4 percent, while it has been about 2 percent for the EU-15. We
wanted to get an idea of how the situation will be in the future if these growth rates
continue. This is to see if a catch up is likely to happen in the near future. In such a
scenario, in 2050, seven countries will have caught up to western living standards. In
addition to the Baltic states and Poland, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Romania will also
have reached the GDP per capita level of the EU-15. The large part of the countries is,
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however, still far off Western European standards. This implies that a rapid catch up is
unlikely, even if the current growth-situation is to continue.
To summarize, the average growth in GDP per capita has been twice as high in our focus
countries compared to EU-15 countries since 1995. At the same time, growth in absolute
numbers still appears to be significantly higher among EU-15 countries. The chapter
also makes us aware of the significant cross-country differences within the region. This is
important insight for interpreting the results of our analysis.
5.1.5 Reliability and Validity assessment
In order to assess sufficient quality of research, we need to ensure validity and reliability.
A carefully executed methodology helps us to avoid a subjective approach to the data
and research (Raimond, 1993). In the table below, we have evaluated the quality of
each variable concerning validity and reliability. The scale ranges from 1-3, where 3 is
considered the best.
Table 5.4: Quality of measurements
Variable Source Rating
GDP per capita World Bank ***
Capital per capita World Bank ***
Labor World Bank ***
Income ’90 World Bank ***
Corruption Transparency International **
FDI World Bank **
External Debt World Bank **
Educational level Barro and Lee **
External conflict ICRG *
Democratic accountability ICRG *
Fast transition IMF *
Government stability ICRG *
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5.1.6 Reliability
Reliability is whether it is possible to replicate the measurement under the same conditions
and achieve the same result. Or put in other words; will other researchers be able to repeat
our findings? It also addresses the consistency of the research and helps minimize errors
and biases in our thesis (Saunders et al., 2019). We evaluate the quality of the source
for each variable, as well as how our processing of the data can affect other researchers’
ability to replicate the outcome.
We have considered several different sources in our work on data collection that form the
basis of our analysis, including Transparency International, OECD, Eurostat, Penn World
Table, and World Bank. We obtained data for our dependent variable, GDP per capita,
from the latter source. This is an open source and considered trustworthy. However, older
GDP data from former Soviet republics often contain errors. Communist countries ignored
service production when measuring the size of the economy, resulting in lower GDP. At
the same time, the valuation of the market was difficult, as prices were not a product of
supply and demand (Svejnar, 2002). It is also uncertain how big the black economy was
both before and after the transition. Although the figures have been adjusted somewhat
in retrospect, we need to be aware of this in interpreting the data. As a consequence
of this, some of the figures were further adjusted in consultation with Ola Honningdal
Grytten. Hence, other researchers studying the same topic will not necessarily end up
with the same result, even though the data is retrieved from the same source.
However, the adjustments are on such a small scale that we do not consider it a direct
threat to reliability. Some differences in GDP data between different providers exist. For
instance, OECD and Eurostat, does not provide data for all of our focus countries. Thus,
it does not make sense to extract data for the available countries and supplement with the
remaining countries from the World Bank database. This can lead to inconsistent data
that may have implications for our results.
The same principles apply to our explanatory variables. For example, corruption data
can be obtained from Transparency International, Worldwide Governance Indicator, and
International Country Risk Guide. All of these sources are trustworthy, but we have
chosen Transparency International in terms of authority and reputation. Here we also
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created dummies for different levels of corruption in each country based on the index.
Other researchers may want to choose a different approach and thus have a different
outcome.
Capital formation is available in the databases of the World Bank, Eurostat, and Penn
World Table. Eurostat only provides data for EU countries, which excludes this source on
the same basis as for GDP per capita. World Bank provides data in the country’s total
Capital formation, not per capita. Since World Bank also offers data on population figures,
it was most appropriate to generate per capita data from the same source. The same line
of argument in terms of the number of countries applies to both Labor and External debt.
The World Bank appears as the database with the widest range of countries, while also
being a recognized source. We make no major adjustments for these variables, except that
we log Capital formation. Hence, we believe that reliability is relatively well taken care of.
Educational level is retrieved from the Barro-Lee Education Dataset. The source is
trustworthy and widely used in scientific articles on the topic. On the other hand, we
make adjustments that can jeopardize the reliability, and thus we must be clear on our
approach. We compile a continuous time series of the five-year intervals in the dataset. At
the same time, the level of education is divided into four categories. It is not certain that
other researchers will adopt the same approach, and thus the outcome may be different.
Breaking down the five-year intervals will also lower the quality of the data somewhat.
Income ’90 is retrieved from the same database as for GDP per capita and therefore needs
no further analysis.
As for FDI, this data is available at the World Bank and the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTD). We use the World Bank as the data is expressed
as a percentage of GDP, which gives us ratios rather than absolute figures as compared to
the UNCTD dataset. This means that we get consistency against the dependent variable,
GDP per capita, which is also retrieved from the World Bank. Fast transition is a dummy
variable based on an IMF report. Countries received a dummy equal to 1 if they performed
"shock therapy" and 0 if not. Here, there may be different assessments for the countries
that are not necessarily at the extremes. In this way, it can reduce reliability if other
researchers consider one or more countries at different dummy values. This is especially
true, given that this is an important explanatory variable in the regression.
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Data for External conflict, Government stability, and Democratic accountability are all
obtained from the ICRG. This is a commercial source, which reduces quality somewhat.
However, we believe that it is sufficient as it is accepted by courts in legal disputes and
contributes to the Transparency International Corruption Index. We have transformed all
values to reach from 1-100 and explained this earlier in the chapter. Hence, this should
not be a significant threat to reliability.
In terms of bias, endogeneity can be a problem. As we will elaborate further in the
methodology chapter, there is a risk that we violate the zero conditional mean assumption.
This may lead to bias in the results, but this is taken into account in the analysis. The
tests of autocorrelation, normality, and heteroskedasticity also contributes to increased
verifiability for researchers in the future, thus increasing reliability.
From our perspective, reliability is relatively well taken care of. We have extracted
the datasets from open sources, which means that other researchers will have the same
opportunities to obtain similar databases. At the same time, we explain how we clean
our data through this chapter, which provides better conditions for replicating the results
afterward.
5.1.7 Validity
Validity in quantitative research refers to whether our different variables actually measure
what we are looking for and if a causal relationship is established (Mohajan, 2017).
Whether GDP per capita is appropriate for what we want to measure - that is, economic
growth in Eastern Europe - is a frequently asked question. McDowell (2009) argues that
GDP does not include any measure of the income distribution, nor the socio-economic
cost in the form of environmental damage. Still, we can argue that these are questions
about economic well-being and quality of life rather than real economic growth.
GDP per capita is relatively easy to quantify, making it appropriate for this type of
analysis. In various databases, GDP per capita is usually stated in US dollars. This allows
researchers to perform cross-sectional comparisons and more natural define differences
between countries. A common currency can have implications as the exchange rate does
not take into account price levels in different countries (Siebert, 1999). However, we avoid
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this by using GDP per capita in 2011 US dollars, adjusted for differences in purchasing
power parity (PPP). Hence, the validity seems to be quite good.
We feel relatively confident that the majority of our explanatory variables measure what we
want them to measure. Corruption, as well as the three democracy indexes, are the most
uncertain variables. Transparency International measures perceived levels of corruption
based on surveys and expert reviews. In other words, it is not a perfect measure of real
corruption, but rather an indication. This must be emphasized in the interpretation of
our results.
For the Fast transition variable, it is conceivable that the dummy captures more than the
actual effect. Empirically, we can see that the countries that conducted "shock therapy"
have typically performed better, but too much of the effect may be attributed to the
dummy. E.g., if these countries had extensive natural resources, this could be the real
reason for growth - not the fact that the transition was rapid.
We also have some doubts as to whether the ratio between Capital and GDP per capita is
fully causal or not. There is a very strong correlation between the two, and it is perhaps
obvious to assume that the effect goes both ways.
Several democracy indexes combine a variety of measures, which results in one total score,
E.g. The Democracy Index by The Economist. To distinguish the effects, we chose to
use more narrow measures; in our case, Democratic accountability, Government stability,
and External conflict. This increases the validity of each variable compared to an overall
democracy index since the three indexes reflect the phenomenon we want to measure and
only that. Despite this, we know that quantifying political information into an index
score is challenging and represents no perfect science. Hence, we believe that the validity
of these explanatory variables is somewhat lower than the traditional macroeconomic
variables.
To ensure that the findings are generalizable, we must assess that the entire research process
is accounted for in terms of design, findings, and context (Saunders et al., 2019). This is
important in order for readers to be able to assess whether the study can be generalized to
another setting (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Most of the variables in our analysis are used
in traditional growth models, so the generalizability can thus be considered relatively high.
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This is typical of quantitative analyzes, where one looks at a part of a larger population,
intending to generalize the findings. However, we must be aware that our regressions
contain several explanatory variables that will not necessarily have an impact if applied to
Western Europe, E.g., external conflict, corruption index, income in 1990, and democratic
accountability.
In summary, the validity of the most significant explanatory variables seems to be good.
However, there is some uncertainty attached to the democracy variables - both in terms
of generalizability and whether they measure what we want.
Our data consists of publicly available information on variables, both more and less
common in explaining economic growth. Despite minor needs of adjusting some data, and




In this chapter, we discuss the methodology in our analysis. Such a discussion is to present
our analytical approach and facilitate for assessment of the validity of our research.
Our quantitative analysis aims to investigate which factors are crucial for growth in GDP
per capita. In order to answer our research question, we have chosen to perform a linear
regression analysis. We do this by applying the data set described in chapter 5. This
chapter will present and discuss the methodology used.
6.1 Correlation analysis
We conduct a correlation analysis in order to understand better the relationship between
the different variables introduced. However, the correlation analysis does not provide
information about causality - only how strong the relationship between two variables is.
By calculating Pearson’s coefficient of correlation, referred to as Pearson’s r, one can study
these possible connections between two different variables (Keller, 2013). The Pearson’s
coefficient ranges between -1 and +1, respectively −1 ≥ r ≥ +1. A coefficient of -1
indicates a negative relationship. Hence a positive coefficient indicates the opposite. A
coefficient equal to 0 implies no linear relationship.
6.2 Regression analysis
A linear regression model aims to determine the relationship between a dependent and one
or more independent variables (Wooldridge, 2012). Our dependent variable will be GDP
per capita in 15 former Soviet Republics as well as Poland and Romania, from 1990 to
2018. We divide the independent variables into economic, demographic, and institutional
variables.
When modeling a linear regression, we create a mathematical equation to explain
relationships between variables. GDP per capita is likely to be explained by several
different factors. Regression results will vary depending on the combination of explanatory
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variables. Therefore, the thesis will apply multiple regression models.
6.2.1 Log-transforming variables
Our regression consists of log-transformed variables, percentages, and indexes from 0-100.
Taking the natural logarithm of variables provides their estimated growth rate. This enables
us to analyze the drivers of GDP per capita. It can also reduce potential skewness in a
distribution. A regression with both log-transformed dependent and explanatory variables
means that one percentage change in the explanatory variable leads to a percentage change
in the dependent variable equal to the coefficient of the respective explanatory variable.
The same interpretation is valid for the variables in percentage, or indexed 0-100. One
point equals one percentage for the indexed variable.
6.2.2 Regression models
When searching for the most suited variables to explain the growth in GDP per capita,
we performed extensive regression analyses. Hence, we tested several combinations of
explanatory variables to learn the effect of adding or subtracting different elements.
The simplest model includes the explanatory variables Labor and Capital. It provides
information of how well the traditional inputs in a model for economic growth explains
GDP per capita for our data.
GDPP erCap = β0 + β1CapitalP erCap + β2Labor + i (6.1)
In order to gain a broader insight in what drives GDP per capita, we added several
variables. One model is expanded with External debt, FDI, No school, Fast transition,
Income ’90 and dummies for the years 1991 to 1996. This model accounts for the effect
of the levels of debt and foreign investment as well as another human capital measure
through an education variable. Additionally, it accounts for early conditions like initial
wealth and how the country transformed to capitalism. Further, the dummies for the
early 1990’s control for potential excess turmoil created by the chaotic nature of such a
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transition period.
GDPP erCap = β0 + β1CapitalP erCap + β2Income
′90 + β3Ext.debt+ β4NoSchool
+β5FDI + β6FastTransition+ β7Labor + β81990 + β91991
+β101992 + β111993 + β121994 + β131995 + β141996 + i
(6.2)
Although Capital traditionally is a key element in explaining economic growth, we also
made models excluding the variable. This is because some of the results in the analysis
raise a question of potential reverse causality and multicollinearity. We will discuss this
more deeply in a later section.
In the next model Fast transition and Income ’90 is excluded in addition to Capital per
capita. The motivation for testing a model where these are excluded derives from their
lack of representing a specific condition in the country. Although potentially relevant
in explaining economic growth they pose a considerable risk of catching effects beyond
those which they are supposed to represent, as discussed in chapter five. The income
level in 1990 is likely to have significant explanatory power for a country’s level of income
today. This could overshadow the effect of other variables like Labor and Educational
level. Further, we replace No school with Higher education as a potentially better measure
of the educational level in the population. In the following model we also include the
dummies for different levels of corruption.
GDPP erCap = β0 + β1Labor + β2Ext.debt+ β3FDI + β4MediumCorruption
+β5HighCorruption+ β6HighEdu+ β71990 + β81991
+β101992 + β111993 + β121994 + β131995 + β141996 + i
(6.3)
We have also controlled for the effect of Democratic accountability, Government stability
and External conflict. The effect of these variables is fairly well represented when adding
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them to the first regression. They are present in the following model
GDPP erCap = β0 + β1CapitalP erCap + β2Ext.debt+ β3Labor
+β4NoSchool + β5FDI + β6FastTransition+ β7Income
′90
+β8ExConflict+ β9Dem.Account+ β10Gov.Stab+ β121990
+β131991 + β141992 + β151993 + β161994 + β171995 + β181996 + i
(6.4)
These four models present a solid foundation for discussion in the later sections. We will,
however, also take advantage of the insight gained from testing several other combinations
of variables in later discussions.
6.2.3 Argumentation for our choice of regression
Our model is a Pooled OLS regression with log-transformed variables. Choosing one model
is equivalent to turning down other models. Panel data is another popular way of doing
data analysis when studying the same individuals or objects over time. In regressions
using panel data, the individual’s heterogeneity is accounted for, allowing for different
intercepts for all individuals. In our example, panel data would account for differences
between the countries. If a country initially were more prosperous than others, it would
have a higher intercept than the other countries.
Conversely, if a country has some institutional problem that is detrimental to economic
growth, its intercept would be lower compared to the rest. This feature of panel data
makes it very suitable for studying the dynamics of change, for example, what effect a
particular regulation has when introduced in several towns or states. Since it accounts
for the heterogeneity, the model is more likely to catch the real effects of the change.
We are, however, not studying the dynamics of change and nor do we wish to take each
country’s heterogeneity out of our analysis. Our goal is to figure out why countries in
Central Eastern Europe are lagging the western world and why there are substantial
internal differences within these. In such an analysis, the answer might well be that
some countries are richer than others because they were so initially. Instead of removing
the heterogeneity, we try to include explanatory variables representing it in our model,
with the goal mentioned above in mind. If one uses the wrong regression type or model
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specification, one runs the risk of biased results
6.2.4 Assumptions for regression analysis
When doing a linear regression analysis, the optimal outcome is for the estimated
coefficients for every variable to be the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). This
implies that an OLS estimator is unbiased and efficient. An estimator of a parameter is
unbiased if the expected value is equal to that parameter, its true value (Keller, 2013).
E(βˆ0) = β0 and E(βˆ1) = β1. Although an estimator is unbiased, it does not imply how
close it is to the parameter. Consequently, another desirable trait is consistency. An
estimator is consistent if the difference between the estimator and the parameter grows
smaller as the sample size grows larger (Keller, 2013).
An estimator is efficient if there are several unbiased estimators, and this estimator has
the lowest variance possible to achieve. As it is difficult to know with certainty, one can
also use the term relative efficiency. Relative efficiency refers to the unbiased estimator
with the lowest variance among the known unbiased estimators.
To achieve this, a set of assumptions must be satisfied. We have primarily performed data
analysis in R, including performing several tests to check if the assumptions hold. Firstly,
the model needs to be linear in the parameters. Secondly, the distribution of the error
variable should be normally distributed. Next, there can be no perfect collinearity. This
means that no explanatory variable is a perfect linear combination of other explanatory
variables. We test this by performing a variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis. The VIF
of an explanatory variable is an index measuring how much the variance of an estimated
regression coefficient alters from collinearity. A VIF below 10 is an acceptable level of
multicollinearity. Some research, however, argues that 5 is a better maximum limit.
Further, the variance in the error term must be unrelated to the explanatory variables
and constant over time. V ar(U |X) = σ2 This is the assumption of homoscedasticity and
is tested with a Breusch-Pagan test.
An OLS regression should ideally also be free of autocorrelation, meaning that the error
terms should not be correlated over time. cov(ui, uj) = 0 We test for autocorrelation with
a Durbin-Watson test, where a test-statistic close to 2 will imply little autocorrelation.
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However, as our data consists of time series data, it is unlikely that we will have a model
free of the phenomenon.
An estimator still can be unbiased and consistent despite the presence of heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation. It will not be efficient, however, meaning that residuals are disturbed.
Hence, one should be careful in making inference if these two assumptions are violated.
Further, as we are working with time-series, the data must be stationary. Stationarity
is a situation where the unconditional mean, variance, and auto-covariance are constant
over time. That is, the movement of the variable does revert to the mean (Wooldridge,
2012). When using non-stationary variables in regressions, the result will be spurious
(Wooldridge, 2012). We test for stationarity with an augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
The last important assumption is that of a zero-conditional mean. This states that all
explanatory variables in all periods must be uncorrelated with the error term: E(ut|X) = 0.
Violation of this assumption will result in endogeneity and, consequently, biased estimators.
An example of this is in the earlier discussion regarding omitted variable bias. The above-
stated condition is one of strict exogeneity. In practice, the necessary assumption is
contemporaneous exogeneity. The latter states that the explanatory variables of period t
must be uncorrelated with the error terms in period t:
E(ut|xt) = 0
Contemporaneous exogeneity will not guarantee unbiasedness, but consistency will
hold. Another name for consistency is asymptotic unbiasedness. It will move towards
unbiasedness as the number of observations increases.
The two latter conditions of autocorrelation and zero conditional mean can be difficult
to satisfy simultaneously when dealing with time series data. Firstly, all variables will
be dependent on their value in the previous period. The reason is that a value from
earlier periods, for example, t-1 and t-2, naturally will be dependent on each other. Hence,
autocorrelation will be present by default:
Cov(x(t− 1), x(t− 2)) 6= 0
To control for this one could include a lagged variable, the value of a variable from an
earlier period. These lagged variables will, however, likely be correlated with the error
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term, and thus violate the zero conditional mean assumption. This trade-off makes it
hard to satisfy all assumptions when working with time-series data fully. As endogeneity
causes biased estimates, while autocorrelation does not, we have chosen not to include
lagged variables. It is, however, still possible that endogeneity is present in the model due
to, for example, omitted variable bias.
Given that we only require contemporaneous exogeneity, we can not achieve a BLUE
estimator. Hence, we must settle for asymptotic unbiasedness. We present the tests and
results in appendix A2. The tests confirm that that residuals are normally distributed,
and that multicollinearity is not an issue. Autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are,
however, present to some extent.
We believe the linear regression with log-transformed variables is a suitable approach to
analyze our data. Although one must be aware of potential issues of endogeneity, other
crucial assumptions are sufficiently satisfied.
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7 Analysis
The following chapter presents the results of our quantitative analysis. The aim is to
provide readers with an understanding of relationships between the variables. Such insights
are valuable when reading the discussion-section coming after.
7.1 Quantitative analysis
7.1.1 Correlation Analysis
Our correlation analysis provides insightful information about the relationships between our
variables. The degree to which the explanatory variables are related to the independent
variable, GDP per capita, varies. Although causality is not certain, it reveals which
explanatory variables that are closely related to the independent variable, GDP per capita,
and those that are not. Additionally, we see that the relationship between explanatory
variables varies widely. Some variables are barely correlated with others, not posing a
risk of multicollinearity. Some variables, however, correlate highly with others, and it is
important to be aware of when they are used in the same regression.
7.1.1.1 Relationship with dependent variable
Several variables have a substantial correlation with the GDP per capita, as evident
in column (1) in table 7.3. Capital per capita has the closest relationship with the
independent variable, with a correlation coefficient of 0.92. Although it implies a solid
positive relationship, it is highly unlikely that the entire relationship is causal. We
discuss this further under the regression analysis. Further, the variables Income ’90, Fast
transition, and Corruption all have a positive correlation coefficient of minimum 0.5,
implying a strong positive relationship. The corruption variable in this analysis is the
entire index from 0-100. A higher score implies less corruption, and thus it seems that less
corruption correlates with economic growth. When taking the correlation of the dummy
variable for High corruption with GDP per capita, the result is negative 0.37, supporting
this finding. Next, Labor is positively correlated with a coefficient of 0.30, in line with
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Table 7.1: Correlation of numerical variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) GDP 1.00
(2) Labor 0.30 1.00
(3) Income’90 0.55 0.45 1.00
(4) Capital 0.92 0.18 0.51 1.00
(5) Corruption 0.55 -0,10 0.01 0.62 1.00
(6) FDI 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.11 1.00
(7) Ex.Debt -0.37 -0.15 -0.06 -0.37 -0.36 0.10 1.00
(8) No.School -0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.23 -0.22 1.00
(9) High.Edu 0.19 -0.01 0.24 0.21 0.09 0.07 -0.14 0.43 1.00
(10) Fast.Trans 0.50 -0.13 -0.13 0.52 0.78 -0.05 -0.53 0.05 0.22 1.00
(11) Ex.Conf 0.27 0.04 0.05 0.29 0.44 -0.23 -0.20 0.28 -0.10 0.36 1.00
(12) Dem.Acc 0.15 -0.54 -0.32 0.21 0.63 -0.20 -0.34 0.05 -0.11 0.60 0.44 1.00
(13) Gov.Stab -0.06 0.24 0.20 -0.11 -0.35 0.23 0.10 -0.08 0.30 -0.15 -0.12 -0.26 1.00
Note : The variables are: GDP = Logged GDP per capita, Labor = Employment in percent, Inome’90 =
GDP per capita in 1990, Capital = Logged capital formation per capita, Corruption = Corruption score
(1-100), FDI = Foreign Direct Investment to GDP, Ex.Debt = External debt to GDP, No.School = Rate
of working stock without school, High.Edu = Rate of working stock with tertiary school, Fast.Trans =
Dummy, 1 if shock therapy, Ex.Conf = Level of external conflict, Dem.Acc = Democratic Accountability,
Gov.Stab = Government stability. Datasource : World Bank, Transparency International, Lee and Barro.
standard economic theory. Other variables with a high positive correlation coefficient are
Higher education, External conflict, and Democratic accountability. The index External
conflict is structured such that a higher score means less external conflict. The only
variable with a negative relationship below 0.1 is External debt. With a correlation
coefficient of negative 0.37, it implies that an increasing amount of debt is related to lower
economic growth.
7.1.1.2 Relationship between explanatory factors
There is no immediate concern of a broad multicollinearity problem based on the correlation
analysis of the explanatory variables. The only coefficients above 0.6 are between the
three variables Corruption, Fast transition, and Democratic accountability. The numbers
confirm the elusion of a multicollinearity problem shown in the VIF-analysis. It does,
however, uncover other interesting relations. Capital is, for example, positively correlated
with Income ’90 with a correlation coefficient of 0.51. This could infer that a high level
of income in 1990 leads to a higher level of capital in later years. We cannot draw firm
7.1 Quantitative analysis 43
conclusions based on the correlation coefficient. However, if one takes this information
one step further, it might suggest that more capital follows higher income. If this is the
case, or at least partially, one should be careful in the interpretation of Capital in the
following regressions, as there is a risk of reverse causality.
Another result worth noting is that Fast transition is strongly positively correlated with
Capital, Corruption, Democratic accountability, and weaker but still substantially with
Higher education. It is also highly negatively correlated with External debt. Hence, it
correlates the "right direction" with several variables also highly correlated with GDP per
capita. An inferential from this could be that a fast, successful transition from a planned
economy to capitalism facilitated the rise of several conditions that helps drive economic
growth.
Lastly, Democratic accountability also correlates strongly with External conflict, with a
correlation coefficient of 0.6. Both of these are indices from ICRG. It might be that a
good score on democratic accountability will bring a lower possibility of external conflicts,
and hence the two variables cover each other in some sense.
7.1.2 Regression Analysis
We study several variables in this analysis. The effect of an explanatory variable on GDP
per capita will vary as the combination of variables in the model changes. To maximize our
insight, we have tested several combinations of explanatory variables, giving us a broader
understanding of the effect of each variable. These regressions resulted in three different
models presented in tables 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4. In these tables, we show the development of
each model, starting with a few variables and studying changes as we add more variables.
In each table several regressions is portrayed, with a total of 19 regressions.
7.1.2.1 Regression 1-6
In table 7.2, we initially regress GDP per capita on Capital and Labor. This equals the
basic growth model where TFP lies in the residual. Both variables are highly significant
with a positive effect on GDP per capita, with Labor showing the highest effect. The
findings are in line with the theory. The explanatory power of the model is quite high,
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at 0,88. However, Capital per capita accounts for nearly all of it. Regressed alone,
Capital and Labor have an explanatory power of 0.85 and 0.09, respectively. Considering
the correlation coefficient between Capital and GDP per capita of 0.92, this is not too
surprising. It does, however, support the suspicion that the results do not provide the
true causal effect of Capital on GDP. Next, we start including variables beyond Capital
and Labor. This is equivalent to including the A in the growth model. We are trying to
explain what comprises TFP. In model 2 the variables External debt and FDI is added.
Both variables are negative, indicating that higher levels of external debt and FDI are
negative for economic growth. All four variables are still highly significant at a one percent
level. The explanatory power increases to 0.89.
Next, the variables Fast transition and Income ’90 is added to model 3. Both are positive
and highly significant, indicating that countries that went through "shock therapy" has
had better economic growth than those who did not. Additionally, countries that were rich
in 1990 are more likely to have a higher level of GDP per capita later. This makes sense,
and the variable Income ’90 alone has 0.3 explanatory power. After the introduction of
these two variables, the significance of External debt falls from one percent level to a ten
percent level. Model 3 has an explanatory power of 0.90.
In model 4, the variable for Higher education is introduced. First, the variable is significant
at a one percent level. The sign of the coefficient is, however, negative. The hypothesis is
that higher education should lead to more economic growth. Thus, the expectation is for
the coefficient to be positive. Additionally, adding Higher education to the model deprives
all significance from both external debt and FDI. Consequently, there is reason to assume
that Higher education is not the best fit for the current model. As an alternative, Higher
education is replaced by the variable No school in model 5 as a measure of the educational
level in the adult population.
The results show that the latter variable is negative and highly significant. This is in
line with expectations, as fewer people without an education should contribute to more
productivity, and hence economic growth. FDI is still negative and insignificant when No
school is added, but External debt is now significant at a five percent level. The coefficient
of No school is, however, at negative 6,2, which is three times as big as Labor, which
formerly had the largest coefficient. This cast some doubt to whether No school represents
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Table 7.2: Regressions 1-6
Dependent variable: GDP per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital 0.708∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
Labor 1.921∗∗∗ 1.934∗∗∗ 1.698∗∗∗ 1.461∗∗∗ 1.453∗∗∗ 1.720∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.218) (0.227) (0.223) (0.210) (0.208)
External debt −0.210∗∗∗ −0.087∗ −0.063 −0.118∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.050) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054)
FDI −0.820∗∗∗ −0.831∗∗∗ −0.132 −0.615 −1.191∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.243) (0.457) (0.419) (0.416)
Fast Transition 0.300∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.057) (0.054) (0.054)
Income ’90 0.235∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.033)
Higher Education −0.849∗∗∗
(0.190)














Constant 3.217∗∗∗ 3.504∗∗∗ 2.190∗∗∗ 1.852∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗ 2.122∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.150) (0.231) (0.232) (0.212) (0.204)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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the true effect on GDP per capita following more people having attended school. When
adding dummies for each year from 1991 to 1996 in model 6, this improves slightly. All
dummies are significant, and the coefficient No school drops from to negative 3.6. This is
still high, but more plausible. Additionally, FDI is now significant at a 1 percent level
again. The explanatory power of this table’s final model is 0.94, with 311 degrees of
freedom. The constants in all models are significant at a one percent level.
Several other variables were also tested in this model but were not significant. This was
the case for the corruption variables. It seemed that the presence of Capital in the model
led to Corruption being insignificant. As Capital has such a high correlation with GDP
per capita, without it necessarily being a causal relationship, it could potentially bias and
disturb the significance of other variables. Although Capital likely has an effect on GDP
per capita, it is interesting to see how other variables behave without its presence. Table
7.3 shows these regressions.
7.1.2.2 Regressions 7-13
We begin in model 7 by running a regression with the explanatory variables Labor and
External debt. Both are highly significant, and the sign of the coefficients is in line with
expectations. The explanatory power is 0.24. Further, in model 8, FDI is added but is
not significant. This changes in model 9 when Higher education is included. FDI turns
positive, with a relatively high coefficient and significant at a one percent level. Higher
education is also significant at one percent level. With this combination of variables,
the coefficient for Higher education has a positive sign, more in line with expectation.
The explanatory power of model 9 is 0,3. Corruption was insignificant in the previous
table, but here it is highly significant. The dummies for Medium and High corruption
is both significant, Medium corruption on a five percent level and High corruption on
a 1 percent level. Additionally, the dummy for High corruption has a larger negative
value than Medium corruption. It seems plausible, as it is natural to assume that more
corruption has a higher impact on economic growth than less corruption. Corruption
was also significant when the index score was included instead of the dummies. When
Corruption is added, FDI turns negative again, this time at a ten percent significance
level.
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Table 7.3: Regressions 7-13
Dependent variable: GDP per Capita
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Labor 2.983∗∗∗ 2.948∗∗∗ 2.766∗∗∗ 4.914∗∗∗ 3.415∗∗∗ 3.770∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗
(0.503) (0.505) (0.524) (0.532) (0.433) (0.425) (0.223)
External debt −0.895∗∗∗ −0.899∗∗∗ −1.031∗∗∗ −0.864∗∗∗ −0.690∗∗∗ −0.845∗∗∗ 0.032
(0.098) (0.098) (0.103) (0.118) (0.089) (0.090) (0.052)
FDI 0.440 3.299∗∗∗ −1.624∗ 1.731∗∗ 0.132 −2.584∗∗∗
(0.620) (1.026) (0.972) (0.840) (0.859) (0.421)
Higher Education 1.567∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗ 0.860∗∗ 0.913∗∗ −0.143
(0.463) (0.440) (0.378) (0.364) (0.168)
Medium Corruption −0.297∗∗ −0.377∗∗∗ −0.301∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.114) (0.101) (0.099) (0.042)
High Corruption −1.075∗∗∗ −1.193∗∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ 0.068















Constant 7.689∗∗∗ 7.689∗∗∗ 7.609∗∗∗ 7.414∗∗∗ 7.939∗∗∗ 7.864∗∗∗ 3.38∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.282) (0.294) (0.300) (0.253) (0.246) (0.155)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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An important note is that the original corruption data only has a range from 2003. The
regressions mentioned above use the original data. Hence, only observations from 2003 are
included in the analysis. In order to test with all observations, we did a similar regression
with the assumed corruption levels used on the early observations in model 11. The results
are mainly the same, except that FDI now turns positive on a 10 percent significance level.
With the same data, we also included dummies for the years 1991 to 1996 in regression
12. Again, the only notable difference is that FDI changes, this time turning insignificant.
The last model has an explanatory power of 0.57, with 365 degrees of freedom. This table
implies that variables like Higher education and Corruption also affect GDP per capita in
a significant way.
As a final check for these variables, we also included the variable Capital. It made a
substantial impact on the model. When it is introduced to the model, coefficients change
significance levels, size, and sign. An example given, Higher education, External debt, and
the dummies for Corruption turn insignificant. Although insignificant, the coefficients for
External debt, Higher education, and High corruption also change sign. The coefficients of
the above-mentioned variables, as well as Labor, is reduced substantially. In the opposite
direction, FDI turns highly significant, negative, and the absolute value of the coefficient
is increased. This final regression shows the immense impact of Capital on other variables.
Another takeaway from the regressions in this table is that FDI is a somewhat volatile
variable. Through these regressions, it has shown four different states, both significant
and insignificant, as both positive and negative. This result finds support in earlier
research as different studies have found FDI to be both positive and negative for economic
growth. We elaborate this further in the discussion section. Some variables that have not
proven significant in the other combinations of regressions. These new variables are in the
regressions in table 7.4.
7.1.2.3 Regressions 14-19
Democratic accountability is the first variable in model 14. It is significant at a five percent
level, and the coefficient is positive, as expected. Based on the coefficient size, the effect
of Democratic accountability on economic growth seems limited. When External conflict
is added in model 15, the coefficient is reduced and turns insignificant. External conflict
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is, however, significant at a one percent level, and the coefficient is positive but small.
Government stability does not have any significant effect. This supports the correlation
analysis, which showed a correlation coefficient close to zero. The explanatory power of
model 16 is 0,073.
Table 7.4: Regressions 14-19
Dependent variable: GDP per Capita
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Democratic Accountability 0.003∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
External Conflict 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.003 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Government Stability −0.001 −0.00003 −0.003∗ −0.004∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Capital 0.666∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.032) (0.044)
Labor 1.865∗∗∗ 2.534∗∗∗ 2.138∗∗∗
(0.324) (0.468) (0.521)






Constant 9.232∗∗∗ 8.368∗∗∗ 8.439∗∗∗ 3.558∗∗∗ 3.602∗∗∗ 3.211∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.258) (0.324) (0.181) (0.200) (0.270)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The effect of adding Capital and Labor is, however, that External conflict turns insignificant,
and Democratic accountability regains its significance. As expected, both the variables for
Labor and Capital are still highly significant. Adding the variable for High corruption in
model 18 does not change the other coefficients other than Democratic ability increasing
its significance from ten to a one percent level. Thus, we confirm again that Capital
removes the significance of the corruption variable. Finally, External debt and Income
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’90 is added to model 19. They are both significant, and the sign of the coefficient is
as expected. After the introduction of these variables, the significance of Democratic
accountability is again reduced to a five percent level, and Government stability turns
significant on a five percent level. Note that the latter has the opposite sign of what we
would expect, and the coefficient is minimal.
7.1.3 Summary
According to the preliminary hypothesis, both Capital and Labor shows a significant and
positive relationship with GDP per capita. Of these, Labor is the larger coefficient by a
clear margin in all but one model. Further, educational level, Income in 1990, and Fast
transition are significant and positively related to GDP per capita. Income in 1990 and
the dummy Fast transition have each almost 0.3 explanatory power. This implies that
important factors for income level in a country are how rich it was in 1990, and well-
organized reforms to capitalism. On the other side, both External debt and Corruption are
significantly negatively related to GDP. This is in line with the expected relations. FDI is
often significant but varies between a positive and negative coefficient. As mentioned, this
is somewhat in line with earlier research. Variables such as Democratic accountability,
Government stability, and External conflict is not very significant in explaining economic
growth according to our analysis.
The findings are mostly in line with expectations. Although the analysis help explain
which variables are important for economic growth, one must keep the possible endogeneity
in mind. We include these results in the discussion of the next section.
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8 Discussion
In the discussion chapter, we interpret the results. We discuss the findings in light of our
theory and literature review to answer the research question.
Our research question was, "Why is economic growth lagging behind in former Comecon
republics, and what explains cross-country differences within the region?". To answer this
question, we will present and discuss each of the explanatory variables. To be able to
assess the validity and context to a greater extent, the discussion will take into account
previous literature and research on the topic. The regression analysis clearly shows that
Labor and Capital are, without a doubt, the two most important explanatory variables
for economic growth in the region.
Especially Capital seems to be essential, but here we must note that it is hardly a fully
causal relationship. The importance of these two variables is in line with previous research
and the neoclassical framework developed by Solow (1956), where the model with capital,
labor, and technology seeks to explain economic growth. In this chapter, we will divide
the discussion into the different explanatory variables, show the effect of each, explain
what causes the effect, and finally explain the probability that such a result is plausible,
given empirical data and previous research.
8.1 Labor
As shown in the correlation and regression analysis, Labor is an important explanatory
variable for growth in our focus countries. The correlation coefficient is positive by 0.30
while being significant and positive in all regressions. This is in line with our theory and
also what we would intuitively expect. Naturally, more people employed result in higher
GDP per capita because a bigger workforce contributes to a higher total GDP despite the
somewhat diminishing marginal utility in the long term. Fewer people being unemployed,
and thus fewer people representing a cost to society will also contribute to growth.
Admittedly, just after the 1990 reform, there were high social costs, including
unemployment. In fifteen of the focus countries, both GDP per capita and the proportion
52 8.1 Labor
of employees were reduced. This shows the inverse relationship between unemployment
and GDP per capita growth. In retrospect, this could be a necessary correction, as
many jobs were superfluous in the years leading up to the transition. The main goal of
transitioning from communism to capitalism was to increase productivity and income level
to western standards. Productivity is expressed as output per worker, Y/L. Together with
the ratio of capital to labor, K/L, productivity also determines wages. The overstaffing
following communist policies hence led to both productivity and wages being low since
the level of capital was below the equilibrium, showed as r* in theory. Increasing capital
was not a feasible alternative in the short run, and hence productivity gains, higher Y/L,
necessarily had to come from decreasing L, the labor force. This brought the ratio between
capital and labor, R, towards equilibrium by increasing the relative share of capital. As
explained in theory this leads to higher productivity per worker and higher wages.
In Poland, unemployment increased to 16 percent, resulting in approximately 1 million
people becoming unemployed (Roaf et al., 2014). However, the forward-thinking reforms
of Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz worked. Consequently, in 1992 the economy
stabilized and growth could begin as the number of people in work increased. If the
outcome of the regression is to make sense, the increase in the labor force must be a result
of market mechanisms rather than state involvement causing over-employment. After
the initial pain of the reforms, productivity increased, and both wages and economic
growth were on the rise. On the other hand, some countries have issues with workers
migrating to other countries. Uzbekistan is one of the countries that chose gradualism
when imposing reforms. Today, they still lack well-functioning systems, which weakens
the effect of privatization (Auyezov, 2018). This causes a severe lack of available jobs in
the country, and millions of the 15 million-strong labor force leaves the country in search
of jobs (Auyezov, 2018). Naturally, this loss of labor force is damaging to the country’s
economic growth.
Labor is a critical factor in the framework of Solow (1956), which is the base for the




The most important explanatory variable in the regression is Capital. It is positively
correlated with GDP per capita 0.92 and highly significant in all regressions, as with the
Labor variable. With an explanatory power of 0.85, we can imagine that it is hardly
a fully causal relationship. However, there is little doubt that Capital is essential to
understanding what drives economic growth. Further analysis revealed that the Capital
variable with one and two lags has an even higher correlation with GDP per capita than
the non-lagged variable. It could imply that the effect of capital on GDP is largest in
the periods after the investments are made. It would make sense as it is normal for an
investment to yield returns in later periods.
Although it is unlikely that these results show a fully causal relationship, a large part of
it could be explained by the initial low levels of capital in the region. It suggests that
the region has been following a process of convergence towards the EU-15, characterized
by a more capital intense economy, as explained in the theory section. After the reforms
opened for more privatization, Western European companies were seeking to move to
manufacture to the Eastern European countries (Marcin Grela, 2017). This led to more
capital in the region, and consequently, a rise in GDP, as production increased.
The positive relationship between Capital and GDP per capita can be found in both the
exogenous models of Solow (1956), but also in the endogenous growth models by Romer
(1986). It was thus to be expected that Capital would play an important role, and we
find good support for our results in the existing literature.
Labor and Capital are traditionally essential variables in explaining economic growth.
Therefore we performed individual regressions for each country with Labor and Capital as
the explanatory variables. Additionally, we included year-dummies for 1991 to 1996 but
excluded these numbers in the table due to formatting considerations. Because we have
less than thirty observations or years, for each country, we did not expect as significant
and unambiguous results as in the past regressions. They did, however, prove to be mostly
in line with previous results and our theory.
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Table 8.1: Capital and Labor for each country
Dependent variable: GDP per Capita
Armenia Azerbadjan Belarus Estonia Georgia Kazakhstan
Capital 0.642∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.319 0.415∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.108) (0.021) (0.079) (0.209) (0.036)
Labor −5.082 19.190∗∗∗ 6.588∗∗∗ 0.318 1.390 4.802∗∗∗
(4.887) (3.748) (0.359) (0.948) (2.847) (1.108)
Kyrgyzstan Lithuania Latvia Moldova Russia Tajikistan
Capital 0.335∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗ −0.115
(0.034) (0.074) (0.103) (0.087) (0.070) (0.097)
Labor −2.703 −0.266 1.332 −2.700∗∗∗ 7.196∗∗∗ 25.836∗∗∗
(1.629) (1.180) (1.521) (0.916) (1.171) (2.299)
Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan Poland Romania
Capital 0.381∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.020) (0.084) (0.071)
Labor 16.063∗∗∗ −5.513 4.902∗∗∗ −1.371∗ 0.754
(0.982) (5.559) (0.532) (0.790) (0.751)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Capital is still highly significant and positive. This applies to all countries, except
Turkmenistan, where data on capital was unavailable. Labor is less significant when
considering each country individually. However, for the countries where labor is significant,
it is mostly positive.
Another interesting aspect when looking at Labor and Capital in this region is the
interaction between the two. As mentioned, the communist governance caused an inefficient
distribution of labor, but the structure of the economy was also inefficient (Marcin Grela,
2017). Compared to Western Europe, the agriculture-sector was substantially larger, both
in terms of the number of workers and as a share of the total economy. In Romania, the
share of workers in agriculture amounted to 45 percent as late as in 2000, while in 2015, it
had shrunken to 30 percent (Marcin Grela, 2017). These shifts were, in large part, driven
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by the transition towards more manufacturing, as mentioned above. Hence, in the years
following the transition to capitalism, one had two significant effects involving capital
and labor. First, the share of capital increased relative to labor, which itself is a driver
for productivity and economic growth, in line with our theory. Additionally, it caused
a shift in the employment structure. Large numbers of the labor force now moved from
agriculture to a more value-creating sector in manufacturing. The interaction of increased
capital, and the shift in employment structure towards more productive sectors, has been
a key for economic growth in our focus countries.
8.3 Educational level
To distinguish the effect of different levels of education, we divide the population of each
country into No school, Primary school, Secondary school, and Higher education. The
correlation coefficient is positive for the proportion of highly educated people with 0.19
and negative for the proportion who have no education with -0.07. It makes intuitive
sense, as one would imagine, that the value creation of a highly educated person would
be greater. This is supported by Hanushek and Wößmann (2007), which points out
that better education increases human capital in the workforce. Thus, it will increase
productivity and, consequently, output. Given this train of thought, the human capital
variable introduced in the growth model of Mankiw et al. (1992) will increase. Thus it
makes sense to assume that Higher education is affecting economic growth. Similarly,
education can increase innovation and thus also lead to better technology, as explained in
the endogenous growth models of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1989).
In the analysis, however, we find no significance for Higher education if Capital is part of
the regression. The lack of significance can partly be explained by the substantial share
of the explanatory power of Capital. It can also be explained by the fact that Higher
education itself does not necessarily lead to economic growth, as we elaborate further
below. No school, on the other hand, gives significant coefficients, both with and without
Capital in the regression. However, we believe that the negative coefficient is too high
and does not represent the real effect on GDP per capita. One possible explanation could
be that the relative change in the proportion without schooling is minimal compared to
the increase in economic growth. Thus it might be given more weight than it should.
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We use the number of years studying as a measure of education. Thus we do not take
into account cross-country differences in the quality of education. According to Hanushek
and Wößmann (2007), this is a weakness of such a quantitative approach. The number
of people with higher education has been increasing in all our focus countries, except
for Tajikistan (Alexandre Ardichvili, 2013). However, according to OECD’s PISA study
Eastern European countries score an average of 440 across all subjects, while the average
is 496 in advanced economies (EBRD, 2018). The PISA study tests the analytical abilities
of 15 years old people in a country. Additionally, merely taking higher education does not
automatically make a productive worker. Looking at, for example, ICT-skills, firms in our
focus countries report a higher mismatch of skills than the United States and Western
Europe (Alexandre Ardichvili, 2013). The chance of the mean-job in our focus countries is
more likely to be automated compared with those of advanced economies (EBRD, 2018).
Hence, in addition to increasing the share of workers with higher education, education
must be of high quality. It must also provide skills matching the demand from firms.
In our theory, this would show through an increase in total factor productivity, A, and
contribute to an increase in economic growth.
8.4 External debt
We calculate External debt as a percentage of GNI and find a negative correlation with
GDP per capita with a coefficient of -0.37. It is significant in almost all regressions, which
implies that External debt harms GDP growth per capita. Earlier literature disagrees to
a greater extent on the effect of External debt based on three approaches.
The first approach can be recognized in the neoclassical models. Here it is suggested
that there is a positive relationship between External debt and GDP per capita. This is
due to it being a result of a lack of internal funding and can thus help stimulate growth
through the financing of capital formation (Cline, 1985). Generalized across the world’s
economies, such an approach may be correct. However, in our population, where countries
have been transition economies and presumptively poor, debt overhang can occur. That
is, the accumulated debt exceeds the present value of expected income (Krugman, 1988).
In such cases, the loans are used in the short term to cover deficits rather than being
invested in projects that drive future growth.
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The second approach has a view of external debt as negative for economic growth.
Macroeconomic instability and inflation can create problems with servicing external debt.
Examples of this were observed after the output from following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, and after the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The monetary overhang from a
drop in production combined with money printing to cover deficits caused hyperinflation in
most countries in the early 90’s. Prices jumped seven times in Poland, 26 times in Russia,
and 100 times in Ukraine (Roaf et al., 2014). The spillovers from the Asian financial
crisis forced Russia to default on its debt and caused a recession for many countries in
the region. In both cases, currencies devalued drastically. This made it challenging to
service external debt and is an example of situations where external debt can be harmful
to a nation’s economy.
A note worth making is that the Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, refused
to accept responsibility for both the assets and liabilities of the former Soviet Union.
Hence, they did not inherit any external debt, along with their independence. Since then,
their reserves accumulated at a faster pace than debt. The financial position of these
countries was favorable until 1995 when Lithuania’s turned negative. These countries are
among the few former Soviet states that have managed to join the EU and are among the
those that are best off economically. Their favorable financial position is likely to have
contributed to financial stability and hence, economic growth in the following years.
A third approach suggests that there may exist a non-linear relationship between External
debt and GDP per capita (Sachs, 1986). The approach implies that the relationship is
positive up to the critical point where the expected present value is lower than the debt
that is accumulated. In 2018, Georgia and Kazakhstan had an External debt share of
110 and 106 percent of GNI, respectively (World Bank, 2019). According to our theory,
the sign of External debt will depend on whether it increases investments in capital and
ideas, or not. Although external funds used for investments could be positive for economic
growth, we are looking at a particular case. Most of our focus countries suffered from
macroeconomic instability, and consequently, external debt was often combined with
hyperinflation. In such cases, rather than contribute to consumption smoothing, external
debt service will grow higher and crowd out investments that spur economic growth.
Hence, we believe that the high level of External debt among our focus countries reduces
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GDP per capita to a greater extent than it stimulates new growth.
8.5 Corruption
The Corruption variable is an index, where low scores indicate high corruption in the
country. This index score is positively correlated with a coefficient of 0.55 with GDP
per capita, which makes sense given the index’s design. We have also created dummies
for Medium and High corruption, both of which are negatively correlated. It supports
our assumption that more corruption results in lower economic growth. Just as with the
Educational level variable, Corruption variables lack significance when Capital is in the
model. In the regressions without Capital, however, the dummies are significant, and the
coefficient for High corruption is larger than that of Medium corruption. In other words,
the size and the signs make sense.
Quantifying the effect of corruption is no easy task. Previous research by OECD (2013),
finds a strong correlation between corruption and output but has greater difficulty showing
the effect on GDP growth, as do we. OECD (2013) points out that the link between the
variables is hourly variant, non-linear, and indirect. Besides, the actual measurement
and various forms of indexes of corruption are different, making it challenging to capture
the true ratio across countries. There is no standard definition of corruption or industry-
standard across anti-corruption organizations such as UNCAC or the OECD Anti-Bribery
Corruption. This can result in different measures being used in previous research.
Although Corruption does not become significant in the regression with Capital, we
still believe it negatively affects GDP per capita. We use the "Corruption perception"
index from Transparency International as a measurement. For the majority of our focus
countries, the public confidence in the state is weak. This could result in the private
sector being less willing to invest long-term as a result of increased uncertainty and lower
expected returns and thus making it more difficult to achieve growth over time. An ideal
environment for economic growth is one where competition is fair. The most competitive
offers win a tender, contracts are upheld, and patents and ideas are protected. In a
corrupt system, this will not necessarily be the case. As a consequence, less productive
companies might stay operating while others do not. Entrepreneurs might also seek to
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other countries with their ideas and startups. This can affect GDP per capita negatively.
Corruption is more likely to arise in structures where power is centralized like it was in
the communist system (Svendsen, 2003). Countries like Russia and Ukraine have yet to
replace the centralized power structures fully and are also two of our countries with the
highest level of corruption. Additionally, they are two of the worst-performing countries
when looking at percentage growth since 1990. Corruption and trust usually have an
inverse relationship. Comparing Western and Eastern Europe, the Western countries, on
average, have higher trust and lower corruption (Svendsen, 2003). Lower trust in the
government will also make it harder to successfully impose reforms in a country (Svendsen,
2003). As high corruption usually leads to lower trust, a possible side effect of it could be
that reforms have been less successful. Hence, corruption can be detrimental to economic
growth both from directly ruining the business environment and through less chance
of imposing reforms crucial for prosperity. Such an environment will likely decrease a
country’s TFP, and hence lower economic growth according to our theory.
8.6 Fast transition
To measure the effect of Fast transition, we created a dummy; 1 for the countries applying
shock therapy and 0 for countries with a gradualist approach. The variable correlates
positively with GDP per capita with a coefficient of 0.5. This indicates that a rapid and
brutal transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy is positive. It
is in line with our hypothesis, and empirical data shows that countries that apply shock
therapy more quickly achieved the stability that provided good growing conditions in
the 1990s. The variable had a value of 0.3, which was highly significant, thus making
it important for explaining growth. However, we are aware that it is a dummy variable,
which consequently carries a risk of being attributed to the effects of several conditions.
Giannaros (2008) finds that the countries that were willing to take the social cost of shock
therapy in the short term, perform better than those who did not in the longer term. These
costs involved stagflation with high inflation and rising unemployment. Consequently, the
negative effect becomes greater but ranges over a shorter period. Poland, the pioneering
country for shock therapy, thus had the best conditions for growth in the 2000 period when
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"all" countries in the region experienced the golden period. Roaf et al. (2014) suggests
that the window for when a transitional country can make a rapid and radical change
may no longer exist. Uzbekistan and Ukraine are two examples of countries that still
struggle with the effects of delayed reforms. As mentioned earlier, Uzbekistan suffers
from a non-privatized economy, which causes a severe lack of available jobs. Ukraine
has, among other things, not managed to decentralize power sufficiently and suffers from
corruption. Both are examples of how a gradualist approach failed to produce successful
reforms. This has led to problems with economic and social stability in different ways.
Thus, it has been a hinder for economic growth.
It is important to remember that a transition from a centrally planned economy to
a market economy is not just about privatization. As discussed earlier in the thesis,
functioning institutional conditions, and a legal framework adapted to a market economy
is essential (Svejnar, 2002). Poland is considered a country that made a fast transition,
but the privatization of businesses was slower than, for example, Russia and Ukraine. In
these two countries, however, there is a negative relationship between mass privatization
and performance. This is a consequence of the institutional conditions not being in place
when privatizing. Sachs (1986) explain the same phenomenon and find that it is the
combination of privatization and institutional reforms that has a positive effect on GDP
growth, not privatization by itself. The reason why some countries succeeded in a fast
transition can be explained by the following; liberalization of prices and currency, as
well as privatization of companies, is relatively simple and can happen quickly. However,
changing the institutional structure is more complicated. In large part, because people
with power act from self-interest and thus are more reluctant to make such a change (Roaf
et al., 2014).
Economic growth has been slowed down after the financial crisis. It is conceivable that
the countries that dared to implement the toughest reforms thus took advantage of the
above mentioned window to a greater extent than others. Today, the region’s economies
behave in much the same way as traditional market economies, which means that this
opportunity may never arise again. Looking at our theory, a fast transition, or shock
therapy, seems to have facilitated both higher labor, capital, and total factor productivity
in general. As the variable contributes to all parts of the theoretic model, it makes sense
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that it is essential in determining economic growth for the different countries.
8.7 Foreign direct investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is very volatile in our analysis. The correlation coefficient
indicates a positive ratio between FDI and GDP per capita but is very low at 0.04. In
the regression analysis, both significance and sign vary with different combinations of
variables, which makes it challenging to draw a clear conclusion on the effect. Earlier
research on FDI also varies between positive and negative impact on economic growth.
Hence it might make sense that the coefficient is so volatile from a literature perspective.
Melnyk et al. (2014) has studied the effect of FDI in earlier Comecon economies and find a
positive relationship. Admittedly, it is pointed out that financial and institutional sectors
must be well-developed in order to achieve the desired effect and at the same time, attract
foreign investment. Again, we observe that institutional stability is crucial for traditional
drivers of growth to impact GDP per capita. Increased inflow of FDI could give companies
in the region new knowledge, technology, and capital. Hence, it is argued that FDI is
an important channel for technology transfer that is crucial for transition economies to
converge. On the contrary, one often sees that the return from foreign investments is the
subject of repatriation. Thus it is profiting the foreign investors rather than countries
or firms receiving the initial investment (Schoors, 2002). From such a perspective, FDI
could harm the capital stock and hence on economic growth.
More FDI can spur economic growth when looking at the golden period from 2000-2007.
Capital inflows to the region skyrocketed, mostly through investments from Western
European countries. This caused a substantial increase in capital in Eastern European
countries. As discussed under Capital, it led to higher economic growth, with a peak in
the period leading up to the financial crisis. However, we see the doubled-edged blade of
foreign investment. When the financial crisis hit, flows of capital to the region dried up.
When foreign investment no longer fuelled domestic demand, most countries went into
a deep recession. Hence, FDI drove growth in the early 2000’s, albeit artificial to some
extent. However, it also contributed to magnify the negative effects of the financial crisis.
These effects are still evident today, through high unemployment and fragile economic
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systems (Roaf et al., 2014).
8.8 Income per capita ’90
We include Income per capita ’90 concerning adjusting for the base different countries
had before the transition. The variable is not surprisingly positively correlated with GDP
per capita at 0.55. In all regressions, it is highly significant with value typically around
0.20, while having high explanatory power at around 0.30.
By taking the initial conditions into account, we can more easily distinguish cross country
differences. The high explanatory power indicates that those countries that were rich in
1990 will have better conditions for being rich today. It will not necessarily translate into
percentage growth, considering the catch-up effect where poor countries converge towards
rich, but in absolute numbers. For example, Russia had GDP per capita of over 20,000
US dollars and, together with the Baltic countries, was the country with the best base
in absolute figures before the transition in the 1990s (World Bank, 2019). Looking at
GDP per capita figures in 2018, the same countries dominate, while Kyrgyz Republic and
Tajikistan, which had the lowest per capita GDP, have not converged remarkably over
the last 30 years. Growth rates vary between countries, but there seems to be little doubt
that the starting point is vital for the position they are in today.
This is in line with the research of de Melo et al. (1997) and Fischer and Sahay (2000),
which found that the initial conditions had an impact. The reason was that countries
struggling financially in 1990 were more reluctant to implement large-scale reforms as
they were already facing large deficits. Hence, those countries with a low GDP per capita
in 1990, had poorer conditions, or will, to implement the reforms that today contribute to
inequalities between the focus countries.
8.9 Less significant variables
External conflict, Democratic accountability, and Government stability, with the two
latter as measures on institutional quality, shows little or no significance in our regressions.
Especially Government stability is intuitively challenging to interpret, as its negatively
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correlated with GDP per capita and only has significance in a few regressions.
The data was obtained from the ICRG and measures a total score based on government
unity, legislative strength, and popular support. We do not rule out the opportunity that
other indexes are more fit for this measuring this effect. When studying the data, we find
that only Poland, Russia, and Romania have increased their score since 1990. Considering
that GDP per capita has increased in the region over the period, it, therefore, makes sense
that we do not get the significant positive effect we expected.
For External conflict, high scores indicate low conflict levels and vice versa. Ukraine and
Russia, which are in conflict with each other, are the only countries with substantially
lower scores than the rest of the region. The latter’s annexation of Crimea has reduced
their score from 84 in 2002 to 54 in 2016 - similarly, Ukraine’s score has been reduced
from 92 to 58. Apart from these two countries, most are at a relatively low level of conflict
associated with high scores, which may explain relatively small values and significance for
the variable.
Democratic accountability is prepared so that high scores reflect the form of government
with the least risk. These are typically governments with democratic elections and a high
degree of independent judiciaries. In this category are the member countries of the EU, in
addition to Romania. At the opposite end of the scale are, among others, Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, both with a score of 25, as well as Belarus, which has a score of 17 out of 100
(The PRS Group, 2017). In context with the growth achieved in the respective countries
over the last 30 years, there is a reason to believe that Democratic accountability plays
an important role without being able to achieve significant results.
All variables in this section profoundly affect the quality institutions in a country. As
discussed previously, institutions are crucial for economic growth in several ways. It affects
a country’s ability to attract capital, the effectiveness of reforms, and it facilitates a sound
business environment in general. Overall the countries would be better suited for a market
economy. Thus, the three variables discussed above are likely to affect economic growth,
although it does not show in the regressions.
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9 Conclusion
This study aimed to identify the most important drivers of growth in 17 former Comecon
countries. Based on a quantitative analysis of GDP per capita in relation to economic
and political measurements, we find that Capital and Labor are the most important
variables for economic growth. Both are positively related, hence more capital reflects in
a higher GDP per capita. This can be viewed as relatively standard economic results and
was expected, given the knowledge we acquired through previous literature and theory.
Our other findings are much as expected, like corruption being bad and high-quality
education being good. The above mentioned variables are relatively easy to quantify
and measure. However, measuring institutional quality based on a variety of estimated
political parameters does not necessarily return representative results. Thus, based on
previous literature, it is natural to believe that institutions play a more important role
than what our regression shows.
The respective explanatory variables have a weak effect in countries where institutions
are not in place. Given the catch up hypothesis, the region should have experienced a
greater convergence towards the more advanced Western economies. However, their lacking
capability to acquire and apply new technologies, partly explained by poor institutional
quality, has impaired the process of convergence. Each of the countries’ decisions on
whether to conduct a fast transition has dramatically influenced the internal differences we
observe in the region today. It seems clear that those who dared to make a rapid transition
have managed to converge with Western Europe to a greater extent than those who did
not. The initial conditions in 1990 affected whether countries did or did not opt for a fast
transition, as already poor countries were more reluctant due to the risk that followed
with the short term social costs. Thus, initial wealth seems to have been important. This
is reflected by observing how countries that were rich relative to the rest of the region in
1990 have maintained their advantage. Despite this, even the best-performing Comecon
countries are far from the GDP per capita level of their neighbors in the west.
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9.1 Weaknesses
When interpreting the results, there are a few things to keep in mind. Our regression
results might be endogenous, particularly from omitted variable bias and reverse causality.
Hence, one should be cautious in interpreting the relationships as causal. The fact that
we, to a greater extent, presents relationships between variables rather than assured causal
effects on growth is a drawback to the thesis. Further, having more than 30 observations
per country for each variable would allow us to infer more from analyses on the specific
countries. It would provide more accurate results.
9.2 Future research
Institutions seem to play a central role, which is difficult to measure and apply
quantitatively. Thus, it could be interesting to do a deeper analysis of the political
system in each country, with the aim of capturing the impact institutions have on
economic growth. Such research will be particularly relevant for the former CIS countries,
which are experiencing both poor institutions and low per capita GDP. It could also be
interesting to do comparative research with the Asian transition economies, which have
achieved a much better growth rate over the last 30 years. This can, to a greater extent,
help to distinguish the real reasons why the former Comecon countries are unable to
converge more towards Western Europe.
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Equation for capital level.
∆K = sY − δK (.1)
The initial model is based on some assumptions. It is based on continuous time and
that it is a single good produced with constant technology. There is no government or
international trade, and all factors of production are fully employed. The labor force
grows at a constant rate of n, and the initial values for capital and labor are given.
Additionally, production has constant returns to scale, and productivity is positive but
diminishing.
The constant growth of labor lets us express labor as a function of the initial level of labor
and the constant growth through several periods t.
L(t) = L0e
nt (.2)
The relative change of the ratio between capital and labor, r, is the difference between the









As described, the growth in L is equal to N, and the additional capital is equal to sF(K,L).
Applying this and rearranging gives us the following equation.









leaves us with the final expression for the relative change in
capital.
∆r = sF (1, r)− nr (.5)
2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2.1: GDP per capita, Indexed 1995
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Figure 2.2: GDP per capita, Absolute numbers
3 Regression Analysis
As discussed in the methodology section, several conditions should be met for the regression
analysis to be reliable. Here we perform tests to verify whether the conditions are met or
not. Our primary focus will be the most complete model in each table with regressions in
the analysis section. Hence, we show tests performed on models 6, 12, and 19. Hence,
they represent the regressions in tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively. We start by plotting
histograms and Q-Q plots for the residuals to check the normality assumption. A bell
curved histogram and a straight line imply normally distributed residuals. From the
figures, we conclude that the normality assumption is satisfied in these regressions.
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Figure 3.1: Hist, model 6 Figure 3.2: Hist, model 12 Figure 3.3: Hist, model 19
Figure 3.4: Q-Q, model 6 Figure 3.5: Q-Q, model 12 Figure 3.6: Q-Q, model 19
Next, we check whether the assumption of homoscedasticity holds. First, we look at
scale-location plots for each regression. If the spread of residuals, the dots, is equal along
with the plot, the assumption holds. If the spread grows more substantial or smaller when
moving along the x-axis; however, the assumption could be violated. In the plots, this
will be highlighted by a red line. A relatively horizontal line implies homoscedasticity.
The y-axis shows the square root of standardized residuals, while fitted values are along
the x-axis.
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Figure 3.7: Scale, model 6 Figure 3.8: Scale, model 12 Figure 3.9: Scale, model 19
From the plots, model 6 satisfy the homoscedasticity assumption. Model 12 does not,
however, as the spread in residuals is increasing. Model 19 is on the edge of being satisfied.
These plots are, however, not bulletproof. Therefore we also perform the Breush-Pagan
test for heteroscedasticity in R. The null hypothesis is rejected at a one percent level in all
three tests. The null hypothesis is that the homoscedasticity assumption is satisfied. Hence,
the test results say that heteroscedasticity is present in the models. Heteroscedasticity is
not a problem when only interpreting the coefficients, but one should be careful when
doing inference. If required, one can create standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity.
Next, we test for autocorrelation. This can also be viewed in a plot, although another
type than the above. Here, we plot the residuals to see if they follow each other in any
specific pattern. If they are, the residuals are likely correlated with each other, and that
autocorrelation is present.
74 3 Regression Analysis
Figure 3.10: Auto, mod 6 Figure 3.11: Auto, mod 12 Figure 3.12: Auto, mod 19
In models 6 and 12 we can see clear patterns. In the first, the residuals have an upward
trend, and in the latter, they form a convex shape. It is harder to tell from the residuals
in model 19. The presence of autocorrelation seems at least to be weaker than in the
former two models. To gain a higher degree of certainty, we conduct a test also here.
The Durbin-Watson test is often used to reveal the presence of autocorrelation. The test
provides a Durbin-Watson statistic, which is close to 2 if there is no autocorrelation. When
performing the test in R, the range of statistics was 0,25 to 0,53. A statistic between 0
and 2 implies positive autocorrelation. The fact that 0,53 is quite far from 2, combined
with the residual plots, it is highly likely that autocorrelation is present. As discussed in
methodology, however, this was expected since we are working with time series.
To check for multicollinearity, we performed a VIF analysis. As previously discussed,
a VIF below 10 is usually acceptable, although some argue that the limit should be 5.
The VIF analysis provided the following results, and as no variable has a VIF above five
multicollinearities is not a problem in our regressions.
3 Regression Analysis 75
Figure 3.13: VIF, model 6
Figure 3.14: VIF, model 12
Figure 3.15: VIF, model 19
76 3 Regression Analysis
Below are the results from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity. In the
Dickey-Fuller test, the null-hypothesis is that the time series has a unit root, which is
non-stationarity. Consequently, a low p-value is desirable. The two tables presented show
results of the Dickey-fuller test on GDP per capita with two different assumptions for
the time series. Table A2.1 shows results with an assumption of upward drift in the
time-series, while table A2.2 assumes both drift and a trend. As it is not always clear
which of the two one should apply, we ran tests for both. The results show low p-values
for all lags in both tables. Only the variable with zero lag in the model with drift and
trend is not rejected at a five percent level. It has a p-value of 0.125, and looking at both
tests as a whole. We conclude that the assumption of stationarity is satisfied.
Table 3.1: Augmented Dickey Fuller test. Left: Drift. Right: Drift and trend
Lag ADF p.value
T -3.069 0.031
T-1 -3.436 0.010
T-2 -4.058 0.010
T-3 -4.421 0.010
T-4 -4.599 0.010
T-5 -4.633 0.010
Lag ADF p.value
T -3.071 0.125
T-1 -3.435 0.049
T-2 -4.052 0.010
T-3 -4.415 0.010
T-4 -4.594 0.010
T-5 -4.628 0.010
